

ORDINATIO VOLUME I

On Revelation and Theology

Bl. John Duns Scotus

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"Aid me, Lord, in my inquiry, to as much knowledge as our reason can attain as I examine those things which you have deigned to reveal to us, and that we hold by most firm faith. For you have preached that you are first and last; teach your servant therefore to show by reason that you are sole, true, total being, and first efficient cause of all things and their ultimate end, and above all of those things for which you bear your chief care, namely the intellectual and rational creature. You are blessed for ages of ages. Amen.

-BL. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

This translation of the *Prologue* of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on volume one of the critical edition of the text by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Frati Quaracchi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome.

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FIRST PART

*On the Necessity of
Revealed Doctrine*

Single Question: Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired.

1. The question¹ is whether it is necessary for man in this present state for some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the intellect, to be supernaturally inspired.²

And that it is not, I argue thus:

Every³ power having something common for first object naturally has power for whatever is contained under that object as for the per se natural object. This is proved by an example about the first object of sight and about the other things contained under it, and thus by induction in the case of other first objects and powers. It is also proved by reason, because the first object is said to be that which is equal to the power; but if the idea of it, namely of the first object, were in something about which the power could not act, the power would not be equal to it but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is plain. But the first natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being; therefore our intellect is naturally able to act about any being whatever, and thus about any intelligible non-being, because the negation is known through the affirmation [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.25.86b34-35, *On Interpretation* 2.2.24b3, *Metaphysics* 4.4.1008a17-18]. Therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is in Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6, 72rb: "Being and thing are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest by other things;" but if something other than them were the first object, they could be made mani-

fest by the idea of that something other; but this is impossible.⁴

2. Further,⁵ sense does not need, for this present state, any supernatural cognition; therefore, neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence: "Nature does not fail in necessary things," *On the Soul*, 3.9.432b21-22; but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that are perfect; therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is necessary for the higher power to attain its act and end. Therefore etc.

3. Further, if some such doctrine be necessary, this is because the power in its pure natural state is not proportionate to the knowable object as such; therefore, it is necessary that by something other than itself it be made proportionate to it. That something other is either natural or supernatural; if natural then the whole thing is disproportionate to the prime object; if supernatural, then the power is disproportionate to it, and thus it must be made proportionate by something else, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, since it is impossible to proceed to infinity, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first by saying that the intellective power is proportionate to everything knowable according to every way of being knowable. Therefore, etc.

4. To the Contrary:

2 *Timothy* 3.16: "All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof..." In addition, in *Baruch* 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: "There is none who could know her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;" therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: "He handed her on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved," as to the *Old Testament*; and then follows, v.38: "After this he is seen on earth and

conversed with men,” as to the *New Testament*.

I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.⁶

A. Opinion of the Philosophers

The philosopher, then, would say, that there is no supernatural knowledge necessary for man in this present state, but that he could acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the action of natural causes. Adduced for this are the authority and reasoning together of the Philosopher from diverse places.

6. First, *On the Soul* 3.5.430a14-15, where he says that “the agent intellect is that whereby it exists for making all things and the possible intellect that whereby it exists for becoming all things.” From this I argue as follows:⁷ when that which is naturally active and that which is naturally passive come together and are not impeded, action necessarily follows [*Averroes, Metaphysics* II com.1, *On the Soul* III com.36], because it does not essentially depend save on these as on prior causes; but the active element with respect to all intelligibles is the agent intellect, and the passive element is the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul and are not impeded. The thing is plain. Therefore, by the natural virtue of these can the act of understanding ensue with respect to any intelligible whatever.

7. There is a confirmation by reason: to every natural passive power there corresponds something naturally active, otherwise

the passive power would be vain in nature if by nothing in nature could it be reduced to act; but the possible intellect is the passive power with respect to any intelligible whatever; so to it there corresponds some natural active power [*Aristotle, On the Soul* 3.5.430a1014, *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15- b15, *On the Heaven* 1.4.271a32-33; *Averroes, Metaphysics* II com.1]. The proposed conclusion then follows. The minor is plain, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing whatever; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever; therefore, it is naturally receptive of any intellection whatever.

8. In addition,⁸ in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18-19, there is a distinction of the speculative habit into the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical; and from the proof of this in the same place [*ibid.* 1025b3-26a19] it does not seem possible for there to be more habits that are speculative, because in these habits the whole of being, both in itself and in its parts, is considered. But just as there could not be any speculative science other than these, so neither could there be any other practical science than the acquired active and productive ones. Therefore, the acquired practical sciences are sufficient for perfecting the practical intellect, and the acquired theoretical sciences sufficient for perfecting the speculative intellect.

9. In addition,⁹ a thing naturally able to understand a principle is naturally able to know the conclusions contained in the principle. I prove this conclusion from the fact that knowledge of conclusions depends only on understanding of the principle and on deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is plain from the definition of ‘know’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12; but a deduction is manifest of itself, as is plain from the definition of a perfect syllogism, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24, because “it is in need of nothing so as to be or appear clearly necessary;” therefore if the principles are understood, everything is had that is necessary for knowledge of the conclusion. And thus

is the major plain.

10. But we naturally understand first principles, in which all the conclusions are virtually contained; therefore, we can naturally know all knowable conclusions.

Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of first principles are the most common terms, therefore we can naturally understand them, because from *Physics* 1.1.184a21-22 the most common things are understood first;¹⁰ “but we know and understand the principles insofar as we know the terms,” *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25; therefore, we can naturally know the first principles.

11. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of first principles are the most common, therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all the concepts under them; now such terms are taken universally in the first principles and thus they extend themselves to all the particular concepts, and consequently to the extreme terms of all special conclusions.¹¹

B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

12. Against this position one can argue in three ways.

Note: nothing supernatural can be shown by natural reason to exist in the wayfarer, or to be necessarily required for his perfection; nor even can one who has [something supernatural] know that it is in him. Therefore, it is impossible here to use natural reason against Aristotle: if it be argued from matters of belief, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence these reasons here made against him have the other premise as something believed or as proved from something believed; therefore, they are only theological persuasions, from things believed to something believed.

13. [First principal reason] – First as follows: everything that acts

through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end.¹² I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end;¹³ everything that per se acts, acts for an end;¹⁴ therefore everything that per se acts in its own way desires the end. Therefore, just as for a natural agent there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act, so for what acts by knowledge (because it too is a per se agent, from *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22) there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act.¹⁵ The major then is plain.

But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore some supernatural knowledge of it is necessary for him.¹⁶

14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, either sets down that happiness is perfect in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in *Ethics* (1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32), or if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, such that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either err about the end in particular or remain in doubt about it;¹⁷ hence in *Ethics* 1.10.1099b11-13 he doubtfully says “if there is any gift from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”¹⁸

15. Secondly the same minor is proved through reason, because of no substance is the proper end known by us save from the acts of it manifest to us from which is shown that such end is fitting for such nature;¹⁹ no acts do we experience or know to be present in our nature for this present state from which we may know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.²⁰

16. This at least is certain, that certain conditions of the end,

on account of which it is more desirable and more fervently to be inquired about, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the naked vision and enjoyment of God is the end of man, yet the conclusion will not follow that these belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, as will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end, therefore, must be known for efficaciously inquiring into the end, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore, a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

17. [Second Principal Reason] – Secondly as follows:²¹ every knower acting for an end must have knowledge how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and he must also have knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and third he must have knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first is plain, because if he not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself for obtaining it. The second is proved because if he not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. If too, as to the third, the necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he may be ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

18. But the wayfarer cannot know these three conditions by natural reason. The proof of the first is because beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and consequently it does not follow by natural necessity on acts of ours of any sort, but is given contingently by God when he accepts some acts in their ordering to him as

meritorious.²² This fact is not naturally knowable, as it seems, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God immediately is from him necessarily [cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.29 q.5, q.30q4 ad 1]. The other two members [n.17], at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptance of the divine will, namely as contingently accepting such and such things worthy of eternal life and also that they are sufficient, cannot be known by natural reason; it depends merely on the divine will about things it is contingently related to; therefore, etc.

19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons objection is made. Against the first [nn.13-16] as follows: every created nature essentially depends on any of its per se causes, and because of such dependence the cause can be known from knowing the caused thing by a demonstration ‘that’,²³ and any per se cause of it can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not disproportionate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that from knowledge of that nature could the end of that nature be naturally known.²⁴

20. Confirmation of the reason: for if from knowledge of a lower nature the end of it is known, no less is this possible in the matter at hand, because there is no lesser dependence in the proposed case of a finite thing on its end than in the case of other things.²⁵

21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition is false ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’,²⁶ which was assumed in the proof of the minor, because from the knowledge of a nature in itself the end of it can be known by a ‘demonstration-that’.

22. But if it be said that the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on

the contrary Augustine says, *On Predestination of the Saints* ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as it belongs to such a nature is also naturally knowable and consequently such a nature’s orderability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it.

23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore, he is naturally ordered to that end;²⁷ therefore from such ordering can that end can be concluded as from knowledge of the nature ordered to it.

24. Again, it is naturally knowable that the first object of the intellect is being, according to Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 1.6 (72rb), and it is naturally knowable that the idea of being is most perfectly saved in God; but the end of every power is the best of the things that are contained under its first object, because in that alone is there perfect rest and delight, from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable that man, according to his intellect, is ordered to God as to his end.

25. The reason is confirmed, because to him to whom some power is naturally knowable, what is its first object is naturally knowable; and, further, he can know what the nature of that first object is saved in, and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; now the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its first object is known to it. And it knows that God is not exceeded by the idea of the first object, because then God would in no way be intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the idea of its object is realized, and so it knows him to be the end of the power.

26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as

follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, then the means in between are known; but necessary for obtaining the end are the means between the nature and the obtaining of its end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that similarly the means necessary for the end can be known.

27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of beings to the end is as necessary in the matter at hand as it is in other cases; but, on account of this sort of connection in other cases, other things are known from the end, as that from the idea of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.

28 [Response to the Instances] – To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although it proceeds from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to it, and to the next one from Augustine, and to the third one from the power and the first object, that all of them accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false under the proper and special ideal under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end, and under which it is capable of consummate grace, and under which it has God for most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known by us in this present state under some general idea that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general idea it does not fittingly belong to them to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that, from a being that is for an end, the end can be demonstrated by a ‘demonstra-

tion-that', I say that it is not true unless the being that is for an end is known under the proper idea under which it has that end. In this way is the minor is. – And when proof is given by proportion [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not for this present state proportional to itself as object save according to the general ideas that can be abstracted from sensible things.

30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper ideas, unless some acts be manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

31. And from this the answer is plain to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor, that the proposition 'the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it' [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not take it that the end could not be known in another way. For it is very true that, if a substance were known under its proper nature, from it as thus known could the per se cause of it be known. But no substance is thus known to us now, and therefore we can deduce now no end proper to a substance save from an evident act of that substance as it is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, about ignorance of the act, by supposing the other, namely about ignorance of the nature in itself.

32. To the second instance from Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition with respect to God in himself under the proper idea of loving, belongs to man's nature according to a special idea, not one common to himself and sensible things; therefore that potentiality is not naturally knowable in man's present state, just as neither is man known under the idea under which this power is his.²⁸ Thus do I reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal con-

clusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposed to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as not to be attained naturally but supernaturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

33. To the other argument [n.24], that must be denied which it assumes, namely that being is naturally known to be the first object of our intellect, and this according to the whole indifference of being to sensible and non-sensible things, and that this does Avicenna say, that it is naturally known. For he has intermingled his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – with philosophical matters, and some things he said as philosophical and proved by reason, others as consonant with his sect; hence he expressly posits in his *Metaphysics* 9.7 (107ra)²⁹ that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore under the first object of the intellect he had to posit that immaterial substance was included. Not so Aristotle [*On the Soul* 3.6.430b27-29; 7.431a14-17, b2; 8.432a8-9], but according to him the first object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.³⁰

34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which act is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

35. If it be objected to this that man in the state of nature when it was instituted could know his nature, therefore also the end of his nature, from the first reason's deduction [n.19]; therefore, that knowledge is not supernatural.

36. Again, against the response to the final reason [n.33]: if then it is not known what is the first object of the intellect (because the intellect is not known under every proper idea under which it regards such object), then it cannot be known of everything whatever that it is intelligible, because the power is not known under every proper idea under which it has regard to everything whatever as intelligible object.

37. I reply: to the first objection [n.35] it would need to be said what sort man's knowledge was when he was instituted, which may be deferred to another place [*Ord.* 4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present state the said knowledge is supernatural, because exceeding his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of according to the state of fallen nature.

38. To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul, or of any power of it, is not now had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object correspond to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act regard that for object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act we experience. But we can have neither knowledge of a supernatural object; and so both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

39. To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. – To the confirmation [n.27] of the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, there is no natural attainment but only acceptance by the divine will rewarding these merits as worthy of such end.

40. [Third Principal Reason] – Again,³¹ thirdly argument is made against the opinion principally of the philosophers. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is noblest because it is about the noblest genus; therefore knowledge of the things that are proper to them is most noble and necessary, for the things proper to them are more perfect knowables than the things in which they agree with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if such properties were handed on in some science capable now of being found, it would be in the science of metaphysics; but metaphysics about the proper features of those separate substances cannot naturally be had by us, as is plain.³² And this is what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things in some way and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals knows in some way all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by knowledge ‘because of what’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include such ‘because of whats’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc.

Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-why’ and from the effects. The proof of this: for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to these properties, or lead it away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three [persons]; but the effects do not show this property, because they do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument from effects to cause is made, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. Also a property of this nature as to

what is outside it is to cause contingently; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers positing that the first thing necessarily causes whatever it causes.³³ About the properties too of other substances the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of these properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers seem also to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances is in accord with the number of the celestial motions. Likewise, that these substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.³⁴

42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that all the necessary properties of separate substances known now to us by faith or common revelation, could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows:³⁵ the necessary things of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but of all revealed necessary things we naturally know the terms; therefore etc.

43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, therefore when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with each extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to immediates. So at length we will come down to immediate necessities that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessities follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know the mediates through the immediates.

44. Proof of the principal minor, because having and not having

faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over this proposition, 'God is triune,' where not only the same name but the same concept one denies and the other affirms; therefore every simple concept that the former has the latter has.

45. [Response to the Instance] – To this I reply: About separate substances there are some immediate truths. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be *a*. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that particularly assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called *b*, *c*. The true mediate assertions do not have evidence save from something immediate. Therefore, they are not of a nature to be known save from this understood immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in *b* and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in *a* nor consequently *a* itself, *b* will be for his intellect a neutral proposition, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition because that, by supposition, is not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but these complexes are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about the quiddities under their proper and special idea, under which idea we do not conceive those quiddities, and so neither do we know those general truths of general concepts.

46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, yet he could abstract from a quadrilateral the idea of a figure and conceive it, still it would be impossible for him to conceive primacy as it is a proper quality of triangle, because it is not in this way conceived save as it is abstracted from triangle; however he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance in numbers. Although this

intellect could form this composite 'some figure is first', because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be neutral for it, because this is a mediate one, included in this immediate one 'the triangle is thus first'; and because he cannot understand this immediate one, because neither can he understand its terms, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from this immediate one.

47. Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say 'therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes', I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes essentially ordered, as for example the 'what it is' of one extreme or a prior property in respect of a later property; and such a thing is the middle for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I concede therefore that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one of the extremes, or is the same as one of the extremes. But if the mean be a particular, contained under one of the extremes and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean particular to the extremes. So it is here. For a whatness under its proper and particular idea having some property immediately inhering in it is a mean inferior to the common concept of which is asserted the property in its common concept; and so it is not a mean for universally proving the property of the common term, but only particularly. This is plain in the example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is the mean, contained under 'figure'; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of the figure in particular.

48. This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as beatific

object is above all necessary. And then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely it supposes that we naturally do not now conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. If also this supposition be denied, one must still say that the concept that can be made about God by virtue of the creature is imperfect; but the concept that would be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. Just as it was said then of general and special concept [n.47], so let it be said in another way of perfect and imperfect concept.

49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: what is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be moved little by little toward the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is of himself indisposed; therefore, he needs to be disposed little by little to the having of that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort that is posited as necessary; therefore etc.

50. But if it be objected that a perfect agent can at once remove the imperfection and at once act, I reply that if it were possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate an activity to the creature as regard obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; now man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him, which is not possible without some imperfect knowledge that precedes the perfect knowledge toward which he is finally ordered.

51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has, through that instrument, no power for any action that exceeds the nature of that instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul uses now in understanding naturally; therefore, it has no power through that light for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to having knowledge by

the sensing way and the way of the senses; therefore, the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by way of sense. But the knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present state; therefore etc.

52. This reason seems to conclude against him who made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such truth cannot be had by means of the senses without a special illumination. And so it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect in no way has any action; but this seems unacceptable, because this action is more perfect than every intellection, and consequently what is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to come together in some way for that action.

53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem particularly efficacious. For the first would be efficacious if it were proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which is pertinent to the question about beatitude, *Ord. 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7*), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present state dispose sufficiently for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by way of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to such knowables.

54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable. However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:³⁶ Posit, someone is not baptized: although he is an adult, does not have any teacher, he does have the sort of good motions that he can have conform to right reason, and guards against the things that natural reason shows him to be bad.

Although God by common law would visit such a person, teaching him through a man or an angel (in the way he visited Cornelius, *Acts 10.1-48*), yet posit that he is not taught by anyone: he will be saved. Likewise, although he be taught afterwards, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing good things preceding teaching he merits the grace by which he is just;³⁷ and yet he does not have theology, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore, nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55. One could say that by willing thing good in genus he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the favor of his liberality;³⁸ therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith;³⁹ therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, yet just as in baptism a simultaneity in infusion is posited, so for the same reason simultaneity can be posited in this case. For God is not less gracious to the one whom, because of his merit by congruity, he justifies without a sacrament, than to him whom, without any merit of his own, he justifies in the reception of the sacrament. Therefore it is possible for God of his absolute power to save anyone at all, and also to bring it about that he merit glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, God give the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to have according to natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking, although of his ordained power God not give it without the preceding habit of faith (because grace is supposed not to be infused without it)⁴⁰ – not because of need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole; also a man would be less perfectly disposed

as regard assent to certain truths without infused faith.

56. And as in this case so I say proportionally about the habit of theology, which when it is perfect includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture; so that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this generally as to everyone; it is not so as to the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is necessary by ordained necessity in an adult able to have a teacher and to understand him, and this as to acquired faith of certain general things.

II. Solution of the Question

57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural.⁴¹ For a receptive power is compared to the act that it receives or to the agent it receives it from. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is said to be a natural if it is naturally inclined, violent if [the act] is against the natural inclination of what undergoes it, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form that it receives nor to the opposite. Now in this comparison there is no supernaturality. But when comparing the receiver to the agent from which it receives the form, then there is naturalness when the receiver is compared to such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but there is supernaturality when it is compared to an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver. Before this distinction be applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and

that the distinction of 'natural' and 'supernatural' may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

59. But a reasonable solution is apparent, because that is per se cause of something on which when posited, with everything else being removed or varied, the effect follows. But now, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced save by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally save by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of 'violent' is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form [Ord. 4 d.43 q.4 n.4], and the per se idea of 'supernatural' is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent [*ibid.* n.5]. The proof is because when receiver and form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently [*ibid.* n.4]; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not naturally active changes the receiver ('only' I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver [*ibid.* n.5].

This is proved secondly in this way because [the form is supernatural] not only in 'being introduced' but also in 'persisting'; some form persists violently in a receiver without extrinsic action, although not for a long time, some form persists naturally and for a long time; some form remains natural, some supernatural, because of the agent only, so that, by exclusion of the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; and it could be said to be natural because, by comparing the form to the receiver only, it perfects naturally [Ord. IV d.43 q.4 n.4].

60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that, when

comparing the possible intellect to actual knowledge in itself, no knowledge is supernatural for it, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and to any knowledge whatever does it naturally incline. But speaking in the second way [n.57], in this way is that supernatural which is generated by an agent that is not of a nature to move the possible intellect to such knowledge naturally.

61. Now for this present state, according to the Philosopher [*On the Soul* 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect is of a nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural for it which is impressed by these agents.

Now by virtue of these agents can all knowledge of a concept be had that is had by a wayfarer according to common law, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of common law necessary.

62. But about propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], once the whole action of the agent intellect and phantasms is posited, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us the knowledge of which is necessary for us. Therefore, knowledge of these things must be handed on to us supernaturally, because no one has been able naturally to discover the knowledge of them and to hand it on to others by teaching, because as they were by natural powers neutral for one, so also for everyone. But whether, after the first handing on of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to doctrine handed down, *Ord.* III. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing on of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, because it is from an agent that, for this present state, is not nat-

urally a mover of the intellect.

63. In another way too could action or knowledge be said to be supernatural, because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object of a nature to cause knowledge of this proposition 'God is triune' and of like ones is the divine essence known under its proper idea; as knowable under this idea it is a supernatural object [*Ord.* I d.3 q.2 n.16]. Whatever agent, then, causes some knowledge of the truths that are of a nature to be evident through such an object so known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of that object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object known in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect, it is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object known in itself would cause.

64. So it is in the case at hand. For he who reveals this truth 'God is triune', causes in the mind some knowledge, though obscure, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would be of a nature to cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in that clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object that is causative of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause knowledge of such truths about this object the way it supplies the place of some lower object that is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must be the case that, in causing even that obscure knowledge, it supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernatural of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, so that if it were to infuse geometry into someone, this geometry would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (that is,⁴² in both ways, because the second implies the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it could not be had naturally; where the second way is, there is a necessity for it be had supernaturally, because it cannot be had naturally.

III. About the Three Principle Reasons against the Philosophers

66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine *City of God* XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine *City of God* XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, *Politics* 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the *Politics*, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “to nourish nothing abandoned.”

68. The third reason [nn.40-41] is confirmed by Augustine *City of God* XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution [nn.57-65]. For because the propositions about which the argument is [nn.40-41, 62] are in themselves neutral for us, no one can have confidence about them on his own testimony, but it is necessary to look for the supernatural testimony of someone superior to the whole human species.

69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine was able to be done and was done is doubtful – namely whether by interior or exterior locution, with some signs applied sufficient to cause assent – it is enough for the purpose that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, but in neither way could it without error have been handed down by man first.

70. Against these three reasons it is at the same time objected that they destroy themselves, because that which is shown to be necessarily in need of being known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except what is true; therefore whatever these reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man, as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward, as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown to be true. Either, then, these reasons are only from faith, or from them the opposite of what they prove is concluded.

71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether

enjoyment is the end', because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but it is not shown by natural reason that this part [of the contradiction] is something that needs necessarily to be known. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one part of the contradiction, this one or that, not determinately to this one save only from things believed [cf. n.12].

IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18 "knowledge is born from knower and known." Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus like a blank tablet, as is said in *On the Soul* 3.4.429b30-30a2. The agent intellect then is that by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as 'making' with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion or rest – as it is described in *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from purpose on account of opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major prop-

osition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of a natural agent in the second way. So it is in the proposed case.

74. When proof is given of the major [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot through a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being or beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it is objected that this cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from natural sources, although nature fails less in nobler things, from *On the Heavens* 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness were to consist in the highest contemplation to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [*On the Soul* 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that speculation can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore, nature is in this respect made more dignified than if the supreme one possible for it were posited to be that natural one; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the *On the Heavens* is not to the purpose, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to motive power, were it present, in the stars. And I concede that universally to that to which a power is given which is of a nature to be organic, an organ is by nature given – I mean in the case of non-deprived things. But in the case at hand a power is given but not one with an organ; however not all other things have been naturally given that, besides the power, come together for the act. From the Philosopher, then, can be

had there that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has the power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of things later required for the act it is not so.

77. In another way it could be said to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in comparison to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in comparison to the received act. The difference between these members is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. Now he minor [n.7] is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It could also easily be in a third way said to the minor by the denial of it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such intellection, yet not for this present state. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

79. As to the third reason [n.8], look for the response of Thomas in *ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2*, where he responds thus, that “a diverse idea of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, a term abstracted from matter (to wit, that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason, from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.”

On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological knowledge about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is plain in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as

if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. His stated response, however, to the third argument [n.8] is thus expounded [*ST IaIIae q.54 a.2 and ad 2*], namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to a scientific habit the principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) there is no distinction through the objects, yet there is a distinction through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and so there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habit; but it is impossible for things to be distinct in the idea of the superior and indistinct in the idea of the inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct through the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet indistinct through the idea of the habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things in idea of ‘animal’ and indistinct from them in idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that principles distinguish habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if they do have some idea of a distinctive cause as to habits they have only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that however much distinct cognitive habits could be posited, yet the necessity of one of them, as though otherwise knowledge would be impossible, would not be preserved by positing the possibility of a second habit whencesoever distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although it treat of all objects of speculation, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to what is proper to them, as was made plain before in the third

reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion (look under *g* [n.9]).

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and so reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt as to something immaterial than contradictories are not both true than as to something material. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being that is divided into the ten categories, and this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God than contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises adjoined; but the minors that should be adjoined to them are not now naturally manifest.

On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make predication of things assumed 'under' the subject terms of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles 'all knowable conclusions are virtually included' [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most

common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is plain by reason, because a middle term cannot be the 'why' in respect of any property save a property that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle is not included why any particular property is, but only why the most common is; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing certain things, save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties, for which properties the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore, there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles.

This is plain in an example, because this statement 'every whole is greater than its part', although it includes the statement 'four is greater than two', and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: 'four is double in respect of two', 'three is in the relation of one and a half to two', for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of them; therefore, the predicates are not known of the subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: 'about anything at all there is affirmation or negation, and about the same thing negated there is both'; the consequence follows, 'therefore about this white or non-white', in such a way that it is licit to descend there under

the predicate and under the subject.

I reply: this principle 'about anything there is affirmation or negation' etc. is equivalent to this proposition 'one part of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false', where there are two distributed terms, and it is licit to descend under each distributed term, 'therefore about this term of this contradiction' etc.; but under the predicate, which stands confusedly only, it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, 'one part of any contradiction about anything, therefore this part'. So it is in other principles; always the predicate of a universal affirmative stands confusedly only, whether there are two distributions there in the subject or one.

And in the example at hand still the matter is plain. Because about man it is knowable that he is able to laugh, never can more be inferred from the principle 'one part of any contradiction' etc. than that 'therefore about man, able to laugh or not able to laugh'. One part, then, of the disjunctive predicate will never be known of the subject through this principle, but there is required other special principle, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing 'able to laugh' determinately of man.

V. To the Principle Arguments

90. To the principal arguments. – To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about natural object. For 'natural object' can be taken either for that which the power can attain naturally or by the action of naturally active causes, or for that to which the power is naturally inclined whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, could be denied by understanding 'natural' in the first way, because the first object is adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power can operate on; but it is not necessary that if the intellect could naturally understand such common thing, that it could natur-

ally understand whatever is contained under it, because the intellection of something contained is much more excellent than a confused intellection of such common thing; thus, when the minor has been conceded in each sense, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely about what is naturally attainable, because in this way was the major false.

91. Against this response I argue that it destroys itself. For the first object is adequate by itself to the power and is true object, that is, that the power regards nothing as object save what the idea of the first object is in, and whatever the idea of the first object is in the power regards as object; therefore, it is impossible for something to be naturally first without whatever is thus contained being naturally the per se object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate and so is first.

Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is a fallacy of figure of speech. For although being as it is something intelligible in a single act (as man is intelligible in a single intellection) is naturally intelligible (for the single intellection of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited to be the first object naturally attainable because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such it is not naturally attainable unless any of them at all is naturally attainable. Therefore it changes here 'this something' to 'some sort of thing' when it argues 'being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect, that is, adequate object, is naturally attainable', for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, like white, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in every intelligible, not as it is understood apart from them.

92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely that the minor is false about natural object, that is, naturally attainable object, – it is true in another way, namely

what the power is naturally inclined or ordained to [n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what is to be set down as the first object naturally attainable, about this below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12. The response is confirmed by Anselm *On Free Choice of the Will* ch.3, “No ability, as I think,” he says, “do we have that is by itself sufficient for act.” He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordered to an object which it cannot naturally attain from natural causes, like whatever is ordered of itself alone [to something] and yet cannot attain it alone.

93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. – To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, because higher things are ordered to passively receiving a greater perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently the perfection of them cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose ultimate perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.

94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not proportionate to firm possession of some propositional truth, that is, it is not a movable proportional to the sort of agents that cannot be known from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect.

When you argue ‘therefore it is made proportional by something else’ I concede the point – both as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a mover’, because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of a ‘form’, because it assents by the assent that is made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it proportionate to the object.

When about that ‘something else’ you ask further ‘whether it is natural or supernatural’, I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form.

When you infer ‘therefore the intellect is not proportionate with it, and is by something else made proportionate with it’, I say that it is of itself in obediential potency to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is proportional with it sufficiently for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made proportional for receiving the assent.

A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not proportional and the recipient is not proportional to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is proportioned to this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made proportionate to such an agent or to the form impressed by it, just as there is need that it be made proportionate to such an object through something else in the aforesaid double way [n.94]

NOTES:

¹ Interpolation: “Desiring something etc. [quoting Peter Lombard *ad loc.*]. Concerning the prologue of the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be supernaturally inspired for him. The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture [n.95]. The third

pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first subject [n.124]. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of the final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is practical [n.217]; the fifth: whether from an order to action [praxis] as to the end it is called per se a practical science.”

² Cf. Scotus, *Lectura* prol. p.1 q.un.; *Rep.*A prol. q.3.

³ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *a*.

⁴ Note by Scotus: “In this question note *a*, *b*, *c* for the principle; again, for the difficulties, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*; they are dealt with in the second question [n.95]. Note, *a* is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and *c* for question 1 [*ibid.*, qq.1-2]; *b* and the following are common in supernatural matters; *d*, *e* for the question about the science of theology for us [n.124].”

⁵ Text marked by Scotus with the letter *b*.

⁶ Interpolation: “and so they honor it more.”

⁷ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *c*.

⁸ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *f*.

⁹ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *d*.

¹⁰ Cancelled text: “therefore we naturally know them, because they are as doors in a house.” Interpolation: “therefore we can naturally understand them, because, from *Physics* 1, the most common things are understood first by us, also because they are as door in a house, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5.”

¹¹ Interpolation: “And thus is this second part of the minor proved.”

¹² Aquinas, *ST* I q.1 a.1; *De Veritate* q.14 a.10 arg.3.

¹³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b13-14.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22.

¹⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.3.

¹⁶ Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.1 a.1; Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.5.

¹⁷ Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.”

¹⁸ Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.1 q.12, a.4 q.5, a.3 1.5.

¹⁹ Interpolation: “This is plain from the descent of a heavy object downwards, which descent is the act of a heavy object with respect to the center and end.”

²⁰ Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.5.

²¹ Note by Scotus: “This proceeds of contingent things; therefore it does not proceed of knowable things.”

²² Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.” *Ord.* I d.17 p.1 q.3 nn.74-75; *Quodl.* q.17 nn.3-6..

²³ A proof from effects to cause, *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78a22-b34, as opposed to a ‘proof-why’, which is from causes to effects.

²⁴ Note by Scotus: “I concede that the end which is the final cause is known, and this in the respect in which it is the final cause, and known in like manner as the efficient cause is known under the idea that is necessarily required for it to be the first efficient cause” [n.29].

²⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.8.

²⁶ Henry of Ghent, *ibid.*

²⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.8 q.2, a4 q.5. In fact many of the arguments in the pages that follow are found largely in parts of Henry of Ghent's *Summa*, which are hereafter for simplicity's sake omitted.

²⁸ Interpolation: "Or Augustine means that in nature there is a potency for receiving. But it cannot be reduced to act by nature."

²⁹ Scotus left the space for '9.7' blank.

³⁰ Interpolation: "But if one opposes to this that, if material quiddity is the first and adequate object of the intellective power, then the intellect will not be able to understand anything about separate substances, because an adequate object includes virtually or formally everything that the power can be made to bear on – but material quiddity contains separate substances neither virtually nor formally, therefore etc. – I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, namely number, figure, etc., are sensed by the sense of sight *per se*, which sensibles are not included either virtually or formally under color or light; for some containing by concomitance is enough."

³¹ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *g* [n.27].

³² Addition cancelled by Scotus: "because they are not included virtually in the first object of metaphysics, namely being."

³³ Interpolation: "A philosopher would say to this reason that what cannot be known by us does not have to be known by us; but it is impossible for any knowledge to be had by us of the properties of separate substances, whether by nature or in-

fused, save as we now have it – and so it is not necessary that a science is infused for knowledge of the properties of separate substances."

³⁴ Interpolation: "Again, from the motion of the heaven it turns out that the angels are perpetually moving it nor, on account of the labor of the angel doing the moving, could the heaven be greater, so that, if one star be added, the angel could not move it, etc." [Aristotle *On the Heaven* 2.1.284a14-18, 12.293a9-10].

³⁵ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *e*.

³⁶ Note by Scotus: "'Suppose there is someone non-baptized' etc. see above at the sign *o≠o*" (which sign begins the next paragraph here). Canceled text: "But against this it could thus be argued by reason," after which comes this interpolation: "But against the principal conclusion, namely that supernatural knowledge is not necessary for man for salvation, it could be argued thus."

³⁷ Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* V q.20.

³⁸ *Ibid.* q.21.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Interpolation [from Appendix A]: "Against the things said, by responding to the question: for he seems to want the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' to be taken chiefly by comparing the receptive power with the act and the form and in no way by comparing it with the agent; he seems also second to want the distinction of natural and supernatural to be taken chiefly by comparing the passive power with the agent and not by comparing it with the act and the form.

Therefore, as to these points, I proceed thus against him: I will show first that the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' should be taken by comparison with the agent; second that it should not be taken chiefly by comparison with the act; third that the distinction of natural and supernatural should be taken by comparison with the act and the form and the second causes; fourth I will solve the reasons he has on his behalf.

The first is proved in this way, by the Commentator on *De Anima* 2 com.26: "Demonstrative definitions are naturally fitted to give causes for everything in the thing defined;" but the violent is defined by comparing the passive power with the agent; therefore the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' has its place by comparison with the agent. The minor is plain, because "the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the thing suffering the violence contributing nothing" *Ethics* 3.3.1110b15-17; but the extrinsic principle is the agent; therefore etc.

Secondly, the same thing is argued thus: that by which certain things differ formally from each other seems to be the formal principle of the distinction between them; but the natural and the violent differ formally by having their principle within and without; therefore etc. The minor is proved by Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23 where, in expounding the definition of nature, he says about the same thing: 'in that in which it is.'

⁴² Interpolation: "but if there is any supernatural knowledge in the second way, it is supernatural", or: "if it were to infuse knowledge of this, 'God is Triune' or the like, this knowledge would be supernatural."

SECOND PART

*On the Sufficiency of
Revealed Doctrine*

Single Question: Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

95. The question is asked whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

That it is not:

Because necessary knowledge was never lacking to the human race; Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature, because Moses first wrote the *Pentateuch*, nor was the whole of Sacred Scripture in the Mosaic law, but only the *Old Testament*; therefore etc.

96. Again, the more acute in intellect any author of human sciences is, the more he avoids superfluity in handing them on; but in Sacred Scripture there seem to be many superfluous things contained, as the many ceremonies and histories, knowledge of which does not seem necessary for salvation; therefore etc.

97. Again, there are many things about which it is not known with certitude from Scripture whether they are sins or not; however knowledge of these things is necessary for salvation, because he who does not know that something is a mortal sin will not avoid it sufficiently; therefore etc.

98. **On the contrary:** Augustine in *City of God* XI ch.3 says, speaking of canonical Scripture: “We have faith in it for things that it is not expedient to be ignorant of and that we are not suited to know by ourselves.”

I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

99. [Diverse Heresies] – There are on this question innumerable heresies that condemn Sacred Scripture, the whole or parts of it, as is clear from the books of Augustine and Damascene *On Heresies*. Some heretics accept nothing of Scripture. Some reject the *Old Testament* in particular, like the Manicheans who, as is clear in Augustine’s book *On the Utility of Believing* ch.2 n.4, say that the *Old Testament* is from the bad principle. Some accept only the *Old Testament*, like the Jews. Some, like the Saracens, accept something of both, with which impure Mohammed mixed innumerable other impurities. But some accept something said in the *New Testament*, to wit diverse heretics who, holding for their foundations diverse judgments of Scripture badly understood, have neglected others; for example *Romans* 14.2: “He who is weak, let him eat herbs,” and the like. Again *James* 5.16: “Confess your sins one to another,” if from this may arise error about the sacrament of penance, that it can be dispensed by any non-priest, – and by relying on these sorts of authorities, badly understood, of Sacred Scripture.

100. [Various Ways of Convicting Heretics] – Against all these together there are eight ways of rationally convicting them, which are: prophetic foretelling, the agreement of the Scriptures, the authority of the writers, the diligence of the recipients, the reasonableness of the contents and the unreasonableness of individual errors, the stability of the Church, the clearness of miracles.

101. [On Prophetic Foretelling] – About the first it is plain. Since only God naturally foresees future contingents with certitude and not from someone else, therefore only he, or someone instructed by him, can predict them with certitude. Now of such things many, foretold in Scripture, have been fulfilled (it is clear to him who considers the prophetic books), from which “there

is no doubt but that the few that remain shall follow,” according to Gregory in a certain homily *On the Advent of the Lord*. [40 *Homilies on the Gospels* I hom.1 n.1]. The same way is touched on by Augustine *City of God* XII ch.10: “That things past are true he shows from the future things he foretold when these with so much truth are fulfilled.”

102. [On the Agreement of the Scriptures] – On the second, namely the agreement of the Scriptures, it is clear thus: in things that are not evident from the terms, nor have principles thus evident from the terms, many people do not agree firmly and infallibly when diversely disposed unless they receive inclination to assent from a cause superior to the intellect; but the writers of the Sacred Canon, being variously disposed and existing at different times, were on such inevident things altogether in agreement. This way Augustine treats of in *City of God* XVIII ch.42 n.1: “Our authors needed to be few so that they not be cheapened by their great number; nor are they so few that their agreement is not to be wondered at; for neither in a great number of philosophers would one easily find those among whom all they thought agrees,” and this Augustine proves there by examples.

For the assumed major premise is not only proved by the example of the philosophers, as Augustine seems to prove it, but also by reason; because since the intellect is of a nature, as concerns consent, to be moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing other than the object seems able to cause such assent unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object; for if nothing of this sort moves the intellect, theology will remain neutral for it. Now there is nothing of this sort about things not evident from the terms save an intellect superior to our own; but nothing intelligent superior to man can effectively teach man save God.

103. If it be said here that later writers, although differently

disposed than the earlier ones and existing at different times, did yet have the doctrine of their predecessors in their writings and acquiesced in believing them, as disciples acquiesce in the teaching of their masters, and in this way wrote nothing that was dissonant from earlier writers, although God did not teach either the latter or the former, – against this Augustine seems to object against this in the above place when he says about the philosophers: “they left in their literary labor memorials of their doctrines,” which memorials their disciples read, and although in some things they, as disciples, were assenting to their predecessors, yet other things they rejected. The thing is clear in the same place [of Augustine] about Aristippus and Antisthenes, who were both Socratics, yet in some things they contradicted each other; and sometimes disciples have even contradicted their master, as Aristotle did Plato. How then did our later writers not contradict earlier ones in some things if they had not had a common teacher inclining their intellect to the same inevident things?

104. Response: because the earlier writers handed on inevident things, therefore the later ones were not able to reject them by reason, and they did not wish to disbelieve them unless they were able to get a cogent reason for themselves, reverencing them as truthful masters; but a philosopher’s disciples were able by reason to reject their masters, because the matter about which they were disputing was capable of having reasons taken from the terms. – An example: a disciple in historiography does not contradict his master in historiography as a philosopher contradicts a philosopher, because histories are not capable of being evident about the past so as to turn a disciple from the master, in the way philosophical reasons can.

Contrary to this at least is Ezekiel prophesying in Babylon at the time that Jeremiah prophesied in Judea.⁴³ Since they both said not only the things that they could have had from Moses as it were their common master, but also many other things, they

could in them have disagreed, since they were not evident from the terms, unless they had had some common teacher superior to the human intellect.

105. [On the Authority of the Writers] – On the third, namely the authority of the writers, it is plain thus: either the books of Scripture belong to the authors whose books they are said to be or they do not. If they do, since they condemn lying, especially in faith or morals, how likely is it that they would have lied saying ‘thus saith the Lord’ if the Lord had not spoken? Or if you say they were deceived, not lying, or that they wanted to lie for the sake of gain, – to the contrary, and first against the first, namely that they were not deceived. For the Blessed Apostle Paul says, *2 Corinthians* 12.2: “I know a man in Christ above fourteen years ago etc.,” and he adds there that he heard, v.4: “unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.” Which assertions do not seem to have been without lie if in asserting he was not certain, because to assert a doubtful thing as if it were a certain truth is a lie, or not far from a lie. From this revelation of Paul, and from many others made to diverse saints, the conclusion is drawn that their intellect could not have been induced to assent, as firmly as they did assent, to things of which they could not have had knowledge by their natural powers, unless by a supernatural agent. – Against the second, namely that they lied for the sake of gain; because they endured the greatest tribulations on behalf of the things they wanted to induce men to believe.

106. If the books are not theirs but others’, this seems an unacceptable thing to say, because in this way any book at all will be denied to be the author’s whose book it is said to be. For why have these books alone been falsely ascribed to authors whose books they were not? – Besides, either those who ascribed the books to them were Christians or they were not. If they were not, it does not seem that their wish was to write down such books and ascribe them to others and magnify a sect whose contrary

they maintained. If they were Christians, how then did those Christians deceitfully ascribe such books to them since their law condemns lying, as said before [n.105]? And for the same reason, how do they assert that God said the many things that are there narrated, and this to the persons to whom the books are attributed, if such things did not happen to such persons? How too would these books have thus been authentic and widely published as belonging to such authors unless they had in fact been theirs and the authors had been authentic? On this point Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* bk.1 ch.2: “By men of the greatest sanctity have they been delivered to us.” Again, Augustine *City of God* XI ch.3, speaking of Christ, says: “Having spoken first through the prophets, then through himself, afterwards through the apostles, as much as he judged sufficient, he established a Scripture, which is named canonical, of the most eminent authority.” This in that place. And in his first epistle to Jerome [*Epist.* 40 ch.3 n.3] (and it is contained in *On Consecration* [Gratian, *Decretum* p.1 d.9 ch.7]) Augustine writes: “If into the Sacred Scriptures have been admitted even useful lies, what in them will remain of authority?” And the same to the same in the same epistle [*Epist.* 82 ch.1 n.3]: “Only in those books of the Scriptures, etc.” (and Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.7 q.7 in corp.).

107. [The Carefulness of the Recipients] – About the fourth, namely the carefulness of the recipients, it is plain thus: either you do not believe anyone about a contingent thing you have not seen, and so you do not believe that the world was made before you, nor that there is a place in the world where you have not been, nor that this man is your father and that woman your mother; and this refusal to believe destroys the whole of political life. If then you wish to believe someone about a contingent thing that is not and was not evident to you, you should most of all believe the community, or those things that the whole community approves, and especially the things that a noteworthy and reputable community has bidden with the greatest care as needing to be approved. Such is the Canon of Scripture. For so

great was the care of the Jews for the books needing to be kept in the Canon, and so great was the care of the Christians for the books needing to be received as authentic, that so great care about any writing needing to be held authentic has not been found, especially since such solemn communities have cared for those Scriptures as for things containing what is necessary for salvation. About this Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.38 says: “How is it that the writing of Enoch, of which Jude makes mention in his epistle, is not contained in the Canon, nor many other writings of which mention is made in the books of *Kings*?”, where he indicates that only that writing was received in the Canon that the authors, not as men, but as prophets, wrote by divine inspiration. And in the same place ch.41 n.3 he says: “The Israelites to whom were entrusted the sayings of God did not in any way confound the false prophets with the true prophets in equality of knowledge, but they are in agreement among themselves and dissent in nothing; they recognized and held the authors of the Sacred Letters to be truthful.”

108. [On the Rationality of the Contents] – On the fifth, namely the rationality of the contents, it is plain as follows: what is more rational than that God as ultimate end “should be loved above all things, and one’s neighbor as oneself”? – that is, ‘as to what [one loves for oneself]’ according to Blessed Gregory [40 *Homilies on the Gospels*, 2 hom.27 n.1]; “on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,” *Matthew* 22.40. Again *Matthew* 7.12: “this do ye to others etc.” From these practical principles, as it were, follow other practical principles handed down in the Scriptures, principles honorable and consonant with reason, just as, concerning their rationality, it can be plain to anybody individually who goes through the precepts, the counsels, and the sacraments; because in all of these there seems to be, as it were, a sort of explication of the law of nature, which “is written in our hearts” [*Romans* 2.15]. This as to morals. On this point Augustine says, *City of God* II ch.28: “Nothing base or shameful is proposed for consideration and imitation when either the True

God’s precepts are insinuated or his miracles narrated or his gifts praised or his benefits requested.”

About things for belief it is plain that we believe nothing about God which imports any imperfection; rather, if there is anything we believe to be true, it attests more to the divine perfection than to the opposite. The thing is plain about the Trinity of persons, about the incarnation of the Word, and the like. For we believe nothing incredible, because then it would be incredible that the world believes them, as Augustine concludes in *City of God* XXII ch.5; yet that the world believes them is not incredible, because we see it.

This law and integrity of Christians are clear in Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.”⁴⁴

109. [The Irrationality of Errors] – On the sixth, namely the irrationality of the separate errors, the thing is plain thus. What will the pagans adduce on behalf of their idolatry in worshipping the works of their own hands, wherein there is nothing of the divine, as is shown sufficiently by philosophers [e.g. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.8.1084a38-b10]? What will the Saracens, disciples of that most worthless swine Mohammed, allege for their scriptures, expecting for beatitude what befits swine and asses, namely gullet and coitus [e.g. *Koran*, sura 36 vv.54-56 et al.]? Despising this promise, Avicenna, who was partly of that sect [*Metaphysics* IX ch.7 106vb], and setting down another end as more perfect and more fitting to man, he says: “Our law, which Mohammed gave us, displays the disposition for a happiness and a misery that are in accord with the body, and there is another promise that is apprehended by the intellect.” And there follows there: “The passion of the wise was much more to obtain this felicity than that of bodies, which, although it were given them, yet did they not attend to it, nor did they value it in

comparison with the felicity that is conjoined to the first truth.” What of the Jews who condemn the *New Testament*, which is promised in their *Old Testament* as the Apostle shows in his epistle to the *Hebrews*? And how tasteless are their ceremonies without Christ [*Hebrews* 9.1-28]! Again, that Christ has come and that thus the New Testament promulgated by him as authentic would be something needing to be accepted is shown by their prophecies: “The scepter,” says Jacob, “shall not depart from Judah...and for him shall the Gentiles wait” *Genesis* 49.10; likewise the verse of *Daniel* 9.24: “When the Holy of holies has come, your anointing will cease.”⁴⁵ – What too the asinine Manicheans who invent the fable of an ‘evil first principle’, although even they themselves, while not a ‘first’, were yet very evil! Surely they saw that every being, insofar as it is, is good? Surely too they could have seen in the *New Testament* that the *Old Testament* is authentic and approved?

110. What the other individual heretics who have understood one word of Scripture badly, according to Augustine *83 Questions* q.69 n.1: “An error cloaked under the Christian name cannot arise except from Scriptures badly understood;” and for this reason, that they did not bring together the antecedents and the consequents. Hence in the same place [q.69 n.2] Augustine says: “A circumstance in the Scriptures is wont to illuminate the meaning.” Nor too did they bring together the other places of Scripture. Hence by isolated reading have heresies arisen that by conferring are repulsed, because those who confer adduced diverse sentences that, as to how they were to be understood, was capable of being discovered from their mutual interconnection. Against them is the word of Augustine in his book *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel,” he says, “save because I believe the Catholic Church.” Therefore, it is irrational to accept one part of the Canon and not another, since the Catholic Church, by believing in which I receive the Canon, receives the whole as equally certain. – Again, the doctrines of the philosophers contain something irrational, as Ar-

istotle proves in *Politics* bk. 2 about diverse polities arranged by diverse philosophers. But even his own polity too is in certain things irrational, as is clear from the solution of the previous question [n.67].⁴⁶

111. [On the Stability of the Church] – On the seventh, namely the stability of the Church, the thing is clear as to the Head from the remark of Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “Will we doubt to trust to the bosom of the same Church which, in the constant confession of the human race from the Apostolic See through a succession of bishops, the heretics barking round it in vain, has obtained the summit of authority?” And a little later: “What else is displeasing to the face of God than to want to resist with so much effort his proclaimed authority?” Hence Gamaliel said, *Acts* 5.38-39: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.” And in *Luke* 22.32 the Lord says to Peter: “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou are converted, strengthen thy brethren.” – The firmness of the Church in its members is plain from the remark of Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.” [v. n.108]. Augustine states a like opinion in *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.4 n.5.⁴⁷ For what save God might induce so great a multitude, prone to sin, to keep a law contrary to flesh and blood?

112. There is confirmation in that the sect of the Jews does not remain in vigor, as Augustine objects against them in the sermon [Ps.-Augustine, *Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* ch.11]: “You, I say, I convene, O Jews!”

If an objection be made about the permanence of the sect of Mohammed, I reply: that sect began more than six hundred years after the law of Christ, and in a short time, if the Lord will, it shall end, because it was much weakened in the 1300th year of Christ, and many of its worshippers are dead and very many put

to flight; and a prophecy is said to exist among them that their sect must be ended.⁴⁸

113. [On the Lucidity of Miracles] – On the eighth, namely the clearness or lucidity of miracles, it is plain thus: God cannot be a false witness; but God himself, invoked by one preaching Scripture to show that its doctrine was true, has done a work proper to himself, and thereby borne witness that what he preached was true. There is a confirmation from Richard [of St. Victor] in *On the Trinity* I ch.2: “Lord, if it is an error, we have been by you deceived, for your deeds have been confirmed by signs so great that they can only have been done by you.”

114. But if it be said that miracles have not been performed, or also that they do not testify to the truth, because even Antichrist will perform miracles, – against the first point can be stated the opinion of Augustine *City of God* XXII ch.5: “If they do not believe that these miracles were done, this one great miracle is sufficient for us, that now without any miracles the whole world believes.”

Note well the miracle and the chapter, because if what we believe is said to be incredible, no less incredible, he says, is that “men ignoble and of lowest rank, small in numbers, unskilled, have been able so effectively to persuade the world, and even the learned in that world, of a thing so incredible,” so that the world believe it, as now we see it has believed [cf. n.108], unless some miracles were done by those men, whereby the world was induced to believe. Hence he there subjoins: “For this reason did the world believe a tiny number of ignoble, low-ranked, unskilled men, because in such contemptible witnesses did divinity more marvelously itself persuade them.” For what is more incredible than that a few teachers, poor and uneducated, should convert many powerful and wise men to a law contrary to flesh and blood? Which fact is especially clear in the case of the many very prudent men, first warring against the faith, afterwards converts: as

about Paul, first a persecutor, afterwards teacher of the Gentiles; about Augustine, first in some way seduced by the Manicheans, afterwards a Catholic doctor; of Dionysius, first a philosopher, afterwards a disciple of Paul; of Cyprian, first a magician, afterwards a most Christian bishop, and innumerable others.

Against the same can be said, second, the remark of Augustine *The City of God* X ch.18: “Or will someone say that these miracles were not done? He can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”⁴⁹ And in the same place on the same point, “If they believe magical or theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which...?”⁵⁰

Against the same, third, is that some of the things done cannot be denied save by the most shameless, as are the miracles performed by Sylvester in the presence of Constantine, both in curing his leprosy and afterwards in his disputation against the Jews, which deeds, as being famous, have not been hid from the world.

115. Against the second point it can be said that if anyone, after being summoned as a witness, should permit some customary sign of bearing witness to be adduced and, although present, should not contradict it, such silence does not cohere with perfect truthfulness; but a miracle is such a sign of God as witness; therefore if he permit miracles to be performed by demons, not contradicting them, namely by announcing that they are not his testimonies, he does not seem to be perfectly truthful, which is impossible. And hereby to what is said of Antichrist, because God predicted that the miracles to be done were not testimonies of the truth, as is clear in *Matthew* 24.24 and *2 Thessalonians* 2.8-9.

Again, against the same point is the difference in the miracles performed by God and those performed by the devil, which

difference Augustine treats of in his book *On the Utility of Believing* ch.16 n.34: “I call a miracle,” he says, “anything that appears difficult beyond the hope or capacity of the one who marvels; some marvels cause admiration alone, others unite great grace and goodwill,” of which sort were the miracles of Christ; and he deals with the matter there extensively.

116. Again, against both points it can be said that there are some miracles, performed in the Christian law, wherein there can be no deceit whether they have been performed, nor that they are testimonies of truth, because done by God: as the rapture of Paul and the revelation of future contingents.

The first claim is clear: because it is impossible for anyone to be deceived about his seeing the essence of God, therefore it was impossible for Paul to believe he saw the divine essence unless he did see it; but this he asserts of himself in *2 Corinthians* 12.2-4, according to the exposition of the saints;⁵¹ therefore it happened truly and not apparently only.

The proof of the first antecedent is that no one can be deceived about some first principle, by believing he understands although he do not understand such a principle, which would not be clear from the apprehended terms that it was a principle and that it was not;⁵² therefore much more can one not be deceived about seeing God. The consequence is plain, because the vision of God is more distant from the understanding of any object at all, even as to the perception of the intellect of the wayfarer, than the understanding of a propositional principle is distant from the understanding of any non- principle. Again, how would the intellect believe it was at rest if it was not at rest [cf. 1 d.2 p.2 q.2 n.31]? Surely, it would be able to recognize its inclination to a truth that it does not see? If it believes it sees God, it believes it is at rest in God; if it does not see, it is not at rest. “Nothing more stupid,” says Augustine, “can be said than that a soul with a false opinion is blessed,” *City of God* XI ch.4 n.2. A second point,

namely that this could only be done by God, is manifest, because no creature can beatify the soul, either simply or for a time [cf. 1 d. 35 q. un. n.13].

The second claim [n.116, miracles as testimonies of truth, like the revelation of future contingents] is plain from many prophecies in both *Testaments* [n.101] Hence against the false miracles of Antichrist an objection, at least as to these two miracles, can be made to him in this way: if you are God, make me to see bare the divine essence, and to have, after the vision, a sure memory of the vision and a certitude that it was the vision of the divine essence bare, and then I will believe you; again, if you are God, tell me what I will do or what I will think or desire on such a day or at such an hour.

And the efficacy of this sort of way, the way of miracles, is indicated by the Savior in *John* 5. 36: “The works that I do bear witness of me,” 10.38: “if you do not wish to believe me, believe the works.”

118. [On the Testimony of Non-believers] – In ninth place too can be adduced the testimony of those who are outside [sc. the Church]. Josephus in *Antiquities of the Jews* XVIII ch.4 n.3 sets down a very beautiful testimony about Christ, where among other things written about Christ he says: “This man was Christ;” where Josephus also confesses his true doctrine and resurrection from the dead.⁵³ Again, about the prophecy of the Sibyl; it is noted in Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.23 n.1. Again, *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.4 n.5, note how individual heretics, when asked about Catholics, send them not to their own people, but to true Catholics, as though they alone too are by everyone called Catholics, even by heretics.

119. [On the Efficacy of Promises] – Tenth and last can be added that God is not lacking to those who seek salvation with all their heart. For many most diligently inquiring after salvation have

been converted to this sect [the Catholic]; and the more fervent they have become in inquiring, the more confirmed they are in this sect and, the more suddenly therein repenting, they have been changed from malice to goodness of life; third, too, many have in great exultation of spirit suffered sorrows on its behalf. Which things do not seem probable did not God singularly approve this sect, resting as it does on Sacred Scripture, and ordain it for salvation.

II. Principle Response to the Question

120. Having established, then, against heretics that the doctrine of the Canon is true, one must see second whether it is necessary and sufficient to the wayfarer for attaining his end.

I say that the doctrine hands on what is the end of man in particular, because it is the vision and enjoyment of God, and this as far as concerns the circumstances of its desirability; to wit, that it will be possessed after the resurrection by man immortal in soul and body together, without end. The doctrine also determines the things that are necessary for the end, and that they are sufficient because they are commanded, “If thou wilt enter into life,” he says, *Matthew* 19.17, “keep the commandments,” about which is *Exodus* 20.1-17; of these too is explication given, both as to what to believe and what to do, in diverse places of Scripture. The properties too of immaterial substances are handed on in Scripture, to the extent it is possible and useful for the wayfarer to know them.⁵⁴

III. To the Principle Arguments

121. To the principal reasons. To the first reason [n.95]. To the minor I reply that the law of nature was content with fewer things, which came down by memory through fathers to sons. Those men were also more endowed in natural powers, and

therefore a modicum of inspired doctrine could suffice them. Or it should otherwise be said to this and to that about the law of Moses, that the ordered progress of Scripture shows its dignity. It is plain from Augustine, *83 Questions* q.53 n.4.

122. To the second [n.96] I say that that is more sweetly grasped that is hid under some literal statement than if it were said expressly; and therefore the fact that what is express in the *New Testament* was veiled under figures in the *Old* contributes to devotion, and this as to the ceremonies; but as to the histories, both are examples declarative of the law. Likewise, from the whole process of Scripture is made plain an ordered government with respect to man and the whole creation.

123. To the third [n.97], Origen in his homily *On Noah's Ark* [*Homilies on Genesis*, hom. 2 n.1]: “In Scripture an opportune silence seems to have been held on this point, about which the nature of the consequence itself would sufficiently teach.”⁵⁵ Hence many necessary truths are not express in Sacred Scripture, although they be virtually contained there as conclusions in the principles; about the investigation of which was the labor useful of doctors and expositors.

If you object that many things in human acts are doubtful as to whether they are mortal sins or not, even after one supposes all the teachings of the doctors and expositors, – I reply: the way of salvation is not doubtful, because a man ought to guard himself from such things as from dangerous things, lest, while he exposes himself to danger, he fall into sin. But if someone wants to seek salvation but by not caring⁵⁶ expose himself to the danger where perhaps from the kind of act there would not be mortal sin, yet he will sin mortally by exposing himself to such danger, as will be touched on elsewhere [4 d.5 q.3 n.2; d.30 q.1 nn.4-5].

NOTES:

⁴³ They were prophesying simultaneously during the space of five years (592-587 AD) at the time of the first Babylonian captivity.

⁴⁴ “Do you not judge too ill-advisedly of human affairs? The fact that nothing of earth, nothing of fire, nothing finally that reaches the senses of the body, is to be worshipped as God, but one must seek after him with the intellect alone, is not a thing of dispute for a few of the very learned, but is believed and preached even by an unskilled crowd of males and females in as many nations and as diverse.”

⁴⁵ Actually a quote from Ps.-Augustine *Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* ch.12, which paraphrases the verse of *Daniel*.

⁴⁶ Interpolation: “For when handing on his own polity he said: ‘It is expedient for temperance that the more aged have intercourse’ (*Politics* 7.16.1335a22-23). Again he says that nothing orphaned [deformed] should be nourished (*ibid.* 1335b20-21). Again he says that, if anyone has generated children beyond what wealth is sufficient for, abortion should be performed before life is perceived, etc. (*ibid.* 1335b22-25). Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* 1.7.28.”

⁴⁷ “For in the Catholic Church, setting aside the purest wisdom to the knowledge of which a few spiritual people in this life attain,...the rest of the crowd, to be sure, is made most safe not by vivacity of understanding but by simplicity of belief;...many other things there are that may most justly hold me in her bosom; the agreement of peoples and nations holds me...”

⁴⁸ Scotus may be thinking of the third battle of Homs that took place in 1299 between the Muslim Mamluks and the Mongols. The prophecy he mentions is also mentioned by others, as by Roger Bacon and William Vorillon.

⁴⁹ More fully: “Or will someone say that these miracles are false and were not done or were deceitfully written down? Whoever says this, if he denies that in these respects any writings are to be believed, he can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”

⁵⁰ More fully: “Further if the worshippers of many gods believe magical books, or as they more honorably think, theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which books the more trust is due the more he is great above all to whom alone they command that sacrifice should be given?”

⁵¹ As in particular St. Augustine, *Epistle to Paulina, On Seeing God*, bk.13 n.31.

⁵² Interpolation: “provided it were clear from the terms that something such were a principle.”

⁵³ The so called *Testimonium Flavianum*, whose authenticity has been much disputed, though it is attested in all mss. and is twice cited by Eusebius (AD 263-339); see the Loeb edition of the *Antiquities*, vol. IX p.49. An interpolation contains the relevant passage here: “But there was in those same times Jesus, a wise man, if however it is right to call him a man. For he was a worker of marvelous deeds, and a teacher of men, of those who gladly hear things that are true; and many indeed of the Jews, many also of the Gentiles, he joined to himself. This man was Christ. Who, although Pilate, on the accusation of the first men of our nation, decreed he should be crucified, was not deserted by those who from the beginning loved him. For he appeared to them on the third day alive again, in accord with what divinely inspired prophets had foretold, whether this miracle or other innumerable miracles about him. But even to the present day the name and race of Christians, who are named after him, perseveres.”

⁵⁴ Interpolation: “Comparing these with the three reasons on which the solution of the preceding question depends [nn.13-18, 40-41], it is plain that Scripture adequately contains the doctrine necessary for the wayfarer.”

⁵⁵ Origen’s authentic text reads: “No science explains everything that needs to be known, but that from which the other things can be sufficiently drawn.”

⁵⁶ Interpolation: “even if” in place of “but not caring”

THIRD PART

On the Object of Theology

Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

124. The question is whether theology is about God as about its first object.

And that it is not is argued in two ways:

[Argument from the First Way] – The first is that something else is the subject of theology, therefore not this.

The antecedent is proved in several ways:

125. First thus, from Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.2 n.2: “All Scripture is of things or of signs;” therefore things or signs are the subject.

126. Again, Scripture has four senses: the anagogical, the anagogical, the tropological, the allegorical, and the historical or literal; but to each of these senses there corresponds some first subject, just as to any other science having only one sense there corresponds a subject in accord with that sense; therefore here there are four subjects.

127. Again, that man is the subject is proved by the authority of the Commentator [Eustratius, *Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Morals*] on *Ethics* bk.1 in the prologue, because, according to him there, moral science is about man as to his soul, medical science is about man as to his body. From this is taken the proposition: ‘all practical science has for first object that for which the end of the practical science is acquired, and not the end itself’; but the end of this science is acquired for man, not God; therefore, man is the subject of this science and not God.

128. Again in another way, though it comes as it were back to

the same: the end of a science is to attain through its act its first object by inducing into it the form principally intended by the science, namely, as in speculative science, to induce into it ‘being known’, because knowledge is there principally intended, in practical science to induce the form to which its action is ordered; now the end here intended is moral goodness, which is not intended to be induced in God but in man; therefore man is its first object.

129. [Argument from the Second Way] – The second way to the proposed conclusion is to show that God is not theology’s first subject.

This is proved first by the authority of Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.2: “A simple form,” he says, “cannot be a subject.”

130. Again, matter does not coincide with the other causes, neither in the same thing in number nor in the same thing in species (*Physics* 2.7.198a24-27); but God is the end and efficient cause of this science; therefore he is not the matter of it.

131. Again, from *Posterior Analytics* 1.28.87a38-39, the subject of a science has parts: principles and properties. But God does not have integral parts, since he is altogether simple, nor subjective parts, since he is singular of himself; nor does he have principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because a property is present in a subject in such a way that it is outside the subject’s essence; in this way is nothing present in God.

132: To the Contrary:

Augustine *City of God* VIII ch.1: “Theology is discourse or reasoning about God.”

Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

133. The question asked second is whether theology is about God under some special idea.

Argument that it is so:

Hugh [of St. Victor] in *On Sacraments* at the beginning [prol. ch.2] means the subject to be “the works of restoration;” therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some idea special to him, namely insofar as he is restorer.

134. Again, Cassiodorus in *On the Psalter* pref. ch.13 means the subject to be Christ, the head with the members; therefore especially as incarnate or as head of the Church will he be the subject.

135. Again, God is absolutely the subject of metaphysics; therefore, if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject here and there is not under altogether the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23: “It is necessary that the most honorable science is about the most honorable subject;” metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation too for this is because he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

136. Again, Averroes on *Physics* 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for positing that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the genus of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes’ reason would not be valid unless he understood that God there was the first subject; therefore etc.

137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under the noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (95rb): “If science were about causes, the one that would be about the end would be noblest.”⁵⁷ From this the conclusion about the good follows, because – according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b12-13 – he who posits an infinity in ends destroys the nature of good, because he destroys the nature of end. From this is taken that the idea of good is the idea of end.

138. On the contrary:

Limited knowledge presupposes absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore, if this science is about God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; no such science is posited; therefore etc.

Question 3: Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

139. The question is whether this science is about all things from the attribution of them to its first subject.

That it is:

Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about what is attributed to it is the same, as he exemplifies there about health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc.

140. On the Contrary:

[Augustine] *On the Trinity* 14 ch.1 n.3: “Neither must it be attributed to this science etc.”⁵⁸

I. Preliminary Remarks

141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I make a distinction about theology in itself and theology in us; second I will assign the idea of the first subject; third I will distinguish theology as to its parts.

[About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science according as the object is of a nature to manifest itself to a proportioned intellect; doctrine however for us is what is of a nature to be had in our intellect about that object. Therefore, theology in itself is such knowledge as the theological object is of a nature to produce in an intellect proportioned to it;

but theology for us is such knowledge as our intellect is of a nature to have of that object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however, geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry is of a nature to produce science about itself in a proportioned intellect.

142. [On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the idea of a first object is to contain in itself first virtually all the truths of the habit. Which I prove thus: first, because the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate and so the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit.

143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that here ‘firstness’ is taken from *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ according as it states adequacy: the object⁵⁹ would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything to the considering of which such habit inclines, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.⁶⁰

144. I explain the ‘first...virtually’ that I said [n.142], because it is the first thing that does not depend on another but other things depend on it; so therefore, ‘to contain first’ is not to depend on other things in containing but other things depend on it, that is, that when *per impossibile* everything else in the idea of the object is removed while the understanding of it remains, it would still objectively contain it. But it does not contain anything else save in the idea of it.

145. That the essence of the object, when habitually known, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit:

The habit that is called science is an intelligible species [likeness]

of the first object; it regards immediate and mediate truths, not formally, but by implication, and its adequate object is formally the quiddity of which it is the species. What wonder, then, if the first object as known contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of *a* to contain virtually knowledge of *b* and for the *a* itself, as known habitually, to contain it, which is that the intelligible species of the *a* itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of *b* in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object does not distinguish them but what is proximate, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of each is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and the habits of them. Accordingly it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature and in time together the habit of the intellect, because I never contemplate something in scientific knowing save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);⁶¹ or they are many habits – nay rather, any truth at all has its proper habit, and, besides this, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible species, and it virtually includes all of them – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time use all the prior ones.

Can it be, then, that a habit, when comparing it with many acts or with one act, has a proper act about each one that is compared? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with the act especially of discursive reasoning? – A proper habit is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I

have two habits; look for the passage with the triangular mark below,⁶² against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor here [1 d.2 p.2 q.1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

146. On the contrary, namely, to the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145],⁶³ there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.⁶⁴

148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the proportion of the object to the proportion of the mover is to the movable or of the active to the passive; the proportion of the object to the habit is as the proportion of the cause to the effect.⁶⁵ Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same idea can act on any patient of the same idea. Therefore, the first extremes of the active proportion to the passive are common to all the per se extremes of this proportion; for there is adequacy between these most common things, because whatever the idea of one is in has respect to whatever the idea of the other is in. But the first extremes of the proportion of cause to effect are not the most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of

many habits differing in species there can be some common object, just as from their objects can a common object be extracted; and so in the sciences a common object is assigned from which there is not one habit in species but only in genus.

150. [On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things necessary but also things contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God, whether as triune or about any of the divine persons, in which he is compared to what is extrinsic, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no natural science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and contingent.

II. About Necessary Theology

A. Opinion of the Philosophers

151. On the basis of what has been said I reply to the first question [nn.124, 141]. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove through three reasons.

The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains them as cause, or as that to which they have attribution, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect by a ‘demonstration that’, for no effect demonstrates that God is triune [n.41] (which is most of all a theological truth) and the like; therefore etc.⁶⁶

152. Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known to the divine intellect alone, therefore it is of an object naturally known to God alone; but God alone is naturally known to himself alone; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is of certain things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to those things, some other things naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, because it is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore, there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known to some created intellect; therefore, the uncreated essence can alone be known to an uncreated intellect alone.

153. Third thus: in no science is as distinct a knowledge or cognition handed on about any other thing that is not its first object as would be handed on in the science that would be about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed on about its non-per se subject as about its per se subject; for then there would be no reason why that subject would be more its subject than another one. Therefore, if God be not here the subject, there is not handed on here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed on in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore, that one would be prior to this one.⁶⁷

154. Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations.

The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13 ch.1 n.2; 14 ch.1 n.3 [and cf. 14 ch.19 n.24] is in some part of itself wisdom, and in another part of itself it is science; but if it were about something non-eternal formally, it would be a science formally about it, and in no way wisdom, because eter-

nal things are not attributed to temporal things.

155. The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as its first subject, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, it follows that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.⁶⁸ Therefore there would be some intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part, which is inappropriate.

156. The third is that, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the same object that is the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

157. The fourth is that “the noblest science is about the noblest genus” [*Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23, *On the Soul* 1.1.402a1-4]; but this science is admitted to be noblest; therefore, it must be that it is about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].

B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. For the understanding of it I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in common, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because a relation presupposes knowledge of an absolute; nor can it be of man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in common or universally, because that is confused knowledge. Therefore, the

noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. – So some science could be posited of God under the idea of relation to something outside him, as some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or some science could be posited of God under the idea of something attributal to him, which is a sort of property, as some posit this science to be of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137]; or it could be posited of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as of being, or infinite being, or necessary existence, or some such thing.

159. Argument against all these positions.

First against the one about common idea, for no common concept said of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths pertaining to the plurality of persons; for if so, since those common concepts are naturally conceived by us, then immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we could know the conclusions, and so acquire the whole of theology naturally.

160. Second, because from the fact common concepts are not to God alone naturally known, therefore neither are the truths included in those common concepts; therefore theology, if it were of God under such a common concept, would not be naturally known to God alone, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].

161. Against the other position about the attributal idea [n.158] argument could be made through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through other special ones.

First, because cognition of him according to what he is is the most perfect cognition, according to what the Philosopher says, *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of this essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of

any attributal property that is disposed as a feature of this nature, according to Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.4.

162. Second, because if those properties differ in reality from God's essence,⁶⁹ his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea, so the essence in its idea has the idea of what is uncaused, and the others, although they be uncaused because of their identity with the essence, yet do not according to their formal idea first include their own being uncaused.

163. Third, because that seems, according to its own proper idea, to be more actual in itself to which communicability to several things extrinsic to it is repugnant; but to essence in itself is communicability to many things extrinsic to it repugnant, and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as this essence insofar as it is infinite.

If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: the infinity is because of infinity and identity with the essence as from the root and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.⁷⁰

164. Against the way too about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] it can be argued as it was against the other two ways, but I give special reasons.

First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason;⁷¹ but a science that does not consider its subject under a real idea is not a science about reality, just as neither is logic about reality although it consider real things as second intentions are attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science about reality, which is false.

165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form any concept per se one; therefore, a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept per accidens one. But

no first science is about a concept per accidens one, because such presupposes the sciences of each part; and therefore, if a subalternate science be about anything per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that treat the parts of the whole separately. Therefore, if theology were of such a per accidens one, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept per se one.

166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God;⁷² therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to him as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: what belongs to something under the idea of not being necessarily inherent does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And so no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question [nn.151-152], namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only to God.

167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], namely that theology is about God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him according as he is man, and not under some universal or accidental idea.

C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

168. To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in some intellect having evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but as known to the intellect itself it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in this intellect contains the evidence of the habit as it is in this intellect.⁷³ But in a habit not having evidence from the object but caused from elsewhere, one must not

grant that its first object has its two stated conditions; rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit, as it is in this respect, as if it were about things contingent that in neither way have the first object. To such a habit, then, not evident from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfect first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. – Our theology is a habit not having evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters does not, as it exists in us, more have evidence from the known object than the theology that is about contingents things does;⁷⁴ therefore to our theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object about which the first truths are immediately known. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept that we can have about what is in itself the first subject,⁷⁵ which subject, however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our theology about necessary things is about the same that theology in itself is about, therefore a first object is assigned to it to this extent, which is to contain the truths in themselves, and this is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is not evident to us, therefore it does not, as known to us, contain those truths, indeed rather it is not known to us.

When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n.146], I reply: it is true that it is not the first object giving evidence to us, but it is the first subject containing all the truths in itself, and of a nature or able to provide evidence sufficiently provided it were known.

These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].

III. On Contingent Theology

169. But now we must see as to contingent theological truths [n.150, *Quodl.* q.7 n.10] what the prime subject is there. And as to these truths I say that no subject contains only necessary truths about itself, because it is of itself equally disposed to contingent truths about itself and to their opposites. There is, however, an order in contingent truths, and some contingent truth is true first;⁷⁶ and so that can be posited the first subject of many contingent truths about which first, that is immediately, is stated the predicate of the first contingent truth (which is as it were the principle in the order of contingent truths), or the predicates of several first contingent truths, if several be first. But the first subject of the first contingent truth is said to be that which, when seen as such, is of a nature to be seen first to be conjoined with the predicate of that truth, because nothing is a first known in contingent truths save through intuition of the extremes; therefore the first intuitable thing in which is the predicate of the first contingent truth is the first subject of all ordered contingent truths.

170. From these statements I say to the issue in question that the divine essence is the first subject of contingent theology, and this when taken in the same way in which it was previously said that it is the first subject of necessary theology [n.167]; – and this holds of that contingent theology in itself as it holds of it as it is in the divine intellect and also of it as it is in the intellect of the blessed. Therefore, of the whole of theology in itself, both of God and of the blessed, the first subject is his essence as this essence, the vision of which by the blessed is like what the cognition of being is in metaphysics; and for that reason blessed vision is not theological [science] but a sort of perfect simple apprehension of the subject naturally preceding science.

171. Of our contingent theology there seems to be the same first

subject as also of necessary theology, and in the way expounded above [n.168], because it is not the subject as containing – even if it is seen in intuition – but as knowable by us, proximate to that which, known intuitively, the predicate of the first evident contingent truth is of a nature to be in [n.169].

On the contrary: it seems that the Word is the adequate object of contingent theology, both of that theology as it is in itself and as it is in the divine intellect, because it is the first subject of all the articles of our reparation.

I reply: something contingent can be first said of the Word, and something of the Holy Spirit, and something of the triune God, as ‘to create’; therefore, the persons will be as it were parts of the subject, just as also some necessary things are first true of the diverse persons.

IV. On Christ as the First Object

172. [The Opinion of Bonaventure] From what has been said the rejection of the opinion that posits Christ as first subject⁷⁷ is plain, because then the necessary truths about the Father and the Holy Spirit – to wit, ‘the Father generates’, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds’ – would not be theological truths, nor would the contingent truths about them, to wit ‘the Father creates through the Son’, ‘the Holy Spirit is sent in time visibly and invisibly’; nor the necessary truths about the triune God, as that he is omnipotent, boundless, nor the contingent truths, as that God creates, God governs the world, remits sins, punishes, rewards, and the like. – All these consequences are proved because to no science does any truth belong per se unless it be about the first subject of it, or about a subjective or integral or essential part of it, or about something essentially attributed to the subject. It is plain that the Father or the Trinity is not Christ, nor part of him in any of the stated ways, nor anything essentially attributed to Christ; both because since Christ states two natures – and this insofar

as he is subject, according to those who posit that – it follows that, as having a created nature, he will be essentially prior to the Father or the Trinity, because an essential attribution is not made save to what is essentially prior, which is false; and because Christ even according to divinity does not have any such priority according to which the Father or the Trinity could be attributed to him.

173. Against this opinion too are the reasons placed last above in the solution of the second question against the position about relation to what is extrinsic [nn.164-166]. – Against the same is the first reason set down for the solution of the first question [n.151], because the necessary truths about the Father, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Trinity cannot be contained first in Christ virtually, because if the Word had not been incarnate, those truths would not have been necessary, which is false. The third reason too in the same place [n.153] is valid here, because no knowledge would have had to be handed down about God save as included in Christ; this knowledge is about the Word only and thus is not the most distinct knowledge that could be handed down; therefore another prior knowledge would need to be required.

174. Making for this point are some of the persuasive considerations there set down [nn.154-156], because the unity which belongs to Christ⁷⁸ as he is one supposit in two natures is not an eternal unity; but it would be necessary to posit the formal unity of the first subject; therefore the first subject as first is not something eternal only.

The persuasive consideration too about faith⁷⁹ seems to be conclusive; for it is not a theological belief or truth that this man was crucified, as it does not implicate the Word in the subject term, because the Jews could naturally see this man on the cross. But it is a theological belief and truth that the Word was a man born of a Virgin, that the Word was a man crucified, that the

Word was a man rising from the dead, and so on about the articles pertaining to humanity; but as for those pertaining to divinity, it is plain that they do not belong first to Christ as he is Christ, but some to the other persons, some to the Trinity.

Therefore, the adequate object of theology is not Christ but something that is as it were common to the Word, about whom are primarily believed the articles pertaining to reparation, and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, about whom are some other theological truths.

175. It seems then that it must be said that just as if in medicine the human body be the subject, about which is considered health and infirmity there as property: if the kinds of human body were body mixed thus and so, to wit blooded body, phlegmatic body, etc., this whole, healthy blooded body, would not there be the first subject, both because it is too particular and also because it includes the property that needs to be considered about the subject, and a property cannot be the idea of the subject, because a subject, as it is subject, is naturally prior to its property, and thus a property would be prior to itself. And in brief, whatever might be said about any medicine handed down, that it was about such sort of thing, although a particular and a per accidens being, at least it would at any rate be impossible for the first science of man's body to be about a healthy blooded body. Rather, if in any way it were about this, another science could be prior: either about man's body in general, because it has in its generality certain properties knowable about it through a common idea, as is a prior to its inferiors; or about blooded body, whose idea is naturally prior to healthy blooded body, and this prior idea virtually contains the other properties; or about man's healthy body, because its nature precedes healthy blooded body. So it is in the proposed case. Christ states the Word-man, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 ch.4]; therefore before the knowledge that would be about Christ as about first subject, there would by nature be another prior one about the Word, if

any things are present in him through the idea by which he is the Word, and prior to that one another one about God as to things that are present in him through the idea of God as God is common to the three persons.

176. Therefore, if we hold theology to be in itself the first knowledge, it will not be first about Christ; and if it is equally about truths common and proper to the three persons, it would not be about any person as about some adequate subject, but about God as God is common to the three persons. And then the thesis will be saved that either every theological truth is about the first subject, to wit a truth that is in God by reason of God, or about a subjective part, as it were, of the first subject, to wit a truth that is properly in some person, or about what is attributed to the first subject or to a part, as it were, of the subject, to wit about the creature as to the respect that it has to God as God and about the nature assumed as to the respect it has to the Word sustaining it [n.172].

177. [The Opinion of Lincoln]⁸⁰ – In another way, however, it is posited that Christ is the prime subject, according to Lincoln in his *The Work of Six Days*, and this according as Christ is one by a triple unity, of which the first is with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the second of the Word with the assumed nature, the third of Christ the head with his members.

And on behalf of this opinion about Christ seems to be the first reason set down for the first question and the penultimate one [nn.151, 156], because the seven articles of the faith pertaining to the humanity [of Christ]⁸¹ God does not contain as subject, because they do not belong to him by nature of his divinity. But the subject does contain the property by whose form the property is in it. Now Christ contains those articles, because they are present in him according to his humanity, and this really; he also contains the others pertaining to his divinity,⁸² because they seem to be present in him according to his divinity.

178. A confirmation is that the subjects of the parts of the doctrine should be contained under the subject of the whole, either as subjective parts or as quasi-integral parts; not so contained under God are the subjects of the parts of Scripture. The thing is proved by many glosses at the beginnings of books, assigning as material causes certain things that are not anything of God, to wit, a gloss on Hosea says that the matter of Hosea is ‘the ten tribes’.

179. Again, third: nothing proper to God is narrated in some place of Scripture, because no fact is there narrated where anything was required on the part of God save only his general influence; therefore such a book is not about God.

180. To the first argument [n.177] I say that the contingent truths asserted of Christ are not contained virtually in any subject in the way a subject is said to contain a property, because then those truths would be necessary; yet they do have a subject of which they are immediately and first asserted, and that is the Word, for the theological truths about the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc. are these: ‘The Word became man’, ‘the Word was born man’, ‘the Word suffered as man’ etc.

When you say that ‘the property is present according to the human nature’, I reply: humanity is not the subject’s first idea at which the resolution stands, but is as it were a prior property mediating between the first subject of these truths, which is the Word, and the other later properties, as ‘born’ etc. It is plain that humanity cannot be the idea of the subject with respect to the first property, which is ‘was incarnate’, because that is said of the Word without humanity being pre-understood as present in the Word as subject; this is the first reason.

181. To the second [n.178] I say that the attribution of the parts of science to the first subject would be enough, and this sort of attribution to God can be saved as to any matter assigned by the

adduced glosses. In another way: the matter of any book whatever is God of whom is therein narrated how he governed the human race; but the tribe or person governed is the remote matter. Thus are such glosses to be understood.

182. Hereby is clear the response to the third [n.179], that although there were some book containing no miracle of God, yet any book contains God’s providence and governance about man in general or about a determinate tribe or person, so much so that if the same history about Pharaoh be written in *Exodus* by Moses and by some Egyptian in the chronicles of the Egyptians, the subject of Moses’ history is God, about whom is transmitted there that he governs man, by mercifully freeing the oppressed Hebrews, by justly punishing the Egyptian oppressors, by wisely ordering a fitting form of liberation and by powerfully doing, for the purpose that the freed people might accept the law with joy, so many signs proper to himself; but the subject of the history of a historiographer would be the kingdom, or the king, or the Egyptian people, whose deeds and fortunes that befell them he intended to write, such that it is incidental to him what God did, but principal what his people did or suffered. Principal for Moses is what God did or permitted, but incidental as it were what the matter happened to be about. And granted that in some places no miracle were narrated, yet what God permitted, by giving assistance according to his ordinary influence, not preventing, this is principally intended in that book insofar as it is part of Scripture; and how that was fittingly ordered to some good, if it was so orderable, or how justly punished if it was bad, this is frequently added in the same or another book, or if it was permitted and not here punished, Scripture is elsewhere not silent about it in general, that it will be punished elsewhere.

V. To the Principle Arguments of the First Question

183. [To the Arguments from the First Way] – To the first argument of the first question [n.125] I say that the authority states that the matter of this science, not the first and formal subject of this science, is things and signs and the like.

184. To the second [n.126] I say that whatever sense is not literal in one part of Scripture, is literal in another part of Scripture; therefore, although some part of Scripture have diverse senses, yet the whole Scripture has all those senses on behalf of the literal sense.

185. To the third [n.127] I say that the argument is to the opposite, in two ways. First, because man is posited to be the subject of moral science or medicine as that which contains virtually all the truths of the science. For the human body contains the idea of health virtually; for that is why the health of man is the sort it is, because the human body is complexioned as it is. Likewise, the soul of man contains the idea of natural felicity virtually, as is plain in *Ethics* 1.9.1097b22-98a20, where the idea of the natural felicity of man is concluded from the soul, or from the idea of the soul. Not so does man contain the idea of the end of this science (of theology), because supernatural felicity or the object of it is not included in the idea of man; and, therefore, man cannot be the first object of this science; therefore etc.

186. Second thus: man is the ultimate end of these sciences, and to this end both health and natural felicity are ordered. My proof is that all love of concupiscence presupposes love of friendship [2 d.6 q.2 n.3]; but health or felicity is loved with love of concupiscence; therefore, what is loved with love of friendship by him who has love of concupiscence is a further end beyond any of these. Such a further end is the body, on one side, and the soul, on the other. Therefore, if man in his body or soul is the subject of this science, it follows that his end is the subject of this science.

187. To the fourth [n.128] I say that the first proposition is false, because the end of a science is nothing other than to attain by its act the proper object of the science -- not to induce by its act some form in an object, because science is not a manufacturing quality.

188. [To the Arguments from the Second Way] – To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of a subject of an accident, not of a subject of study.

To the text from the *Physics* [n.130] I say that it means ‘matter from which’, because this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means ‘matter of which’ or ‘about which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science as to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; however the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of object ‘about which’ and the idea of susceptible matter run together, because the act of it is a making that passes beyond to what is outside it. Not so in the case of the proper act of a science; however, a science is understood to pass beyond, because it does not terminate in itself but in that about which it is, although it is not received into the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be matter in relation to the science and its act.⁸³

189. To the text from the *Posterior Analytics* [n.131] I say that the object of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore, the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science [of theology] the object is this essence [sc. God] as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into sub-

jective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are quasi subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them as it is in other imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many.

190. As to what is added about properties [n.131], some say the attributes are quasi properties of the essence itself. But this is not valid, because any attribute as a 'this' can properly be known theologically of God, though anything as known confusedly is known metaphysically of him. For just as God in this way and that, that is, as a 'this' and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian and to the metaphysician, so too does any attribute taken in this way and in that.⁸⁴ Now as to the added point that a property is outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really caused by the object; but in divine reality that which has the idea of a property is not caused, because it passes into essence by way of identity; however, as to its knowability, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.

191. As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of what is knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but it is necessary that of any subject whatever there be principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the middle terms of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, just as self-evident principles are. In this way, of any subject at all, however much it is not a principle with respect to its properties, there can be principles.⁸⁵

VI. To the Principle Arguments of the Second Question

192. To the first argument of the second question, when argument is made by Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus [nn.133-134], it is said that they are not speaking here of the formal object but of the proximate matter (which is more diffusively dealt with in Scripture), because of the more immediate order they have to the end.

193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being may be dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God, there is in addition to it some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being.

But when it is proved by the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics* [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his reasoning concludes as follows: 'the noblest science is about the noblest genus', either as first subject, or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which it can be considered in any naturally acquired science. But although God is not the first subject in metaphysics, he is yet considered in that science in the noblest way that he can be considered in any science naturally acquired.⁸⁶

194. To the Commentator on the *Physics* [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, because if the existence of any separate substances were a supposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the 'whether it exists' about the sub-

ject of metaphysics, which is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. – Second, because by every condition of an effect can it be proved of the cause that it exist, which condition cannot be in the effect unless the cause exist; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that cannot be present save from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is actually something simple, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from natural properties when a first mover is shown to exist; also there is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

195. To the other [n.137] I say that the relation of end is not the noblest idea of knowledge, but that which is the end (as the idea of the foundation of this relation) is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end to creatures; therefore, the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And so the argument is for the opposite.

But when proof from *Metaphysics* II about the good is given [n.137], I say that if through some appropriation goodness is the foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However, it is not necessary that goodness is the proper idea of the end, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, as to the remark of Avicenna on *Metaphysics* VI [n.137],

that it must not be understood of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.

VII. To the Third Question

A. Opinion of Others

196. To the third question [n.139] it seems it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables,⁸⁷ because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first virtually many truths about themselves. The proof is because if, after everything else per impossible has been removed, these quiddities were uncreated, they would still contain such truths, as is plain of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, it could be posited that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science,⁸⁸ as: there would be a theology that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, and there would be a geometry in his intellect that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by reason of number, and so on about others.

197. Against this in three ways:

First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be as it were in potency to knowing the truths that exist in line – and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line – , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting knowledge of these truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be a mover of the divine intellect.

198. Second as follows: the first object of every power made actual by diverse objects per se by their proper virtue is something common to them; but if line, by virtue of itself, were to cause

truth in the divine intellect, by parity of reasoning will other things too cause truth in God's intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be being in common, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore, it will be first by virtualness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were, in accord with its own virtue, to effect a change in his intellect.

B. Scotus' Own Response

200. [About divine theology] – Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God's theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first to his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, there is not an order of the second to the third according to causality, as if these quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, because his own essence first in nature as it were causes these quiddities to be known before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19].

An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun were only able, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part illuminated before first, would illuminate that distant part;

there would, however, be an order between the near part and the remote part like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet not an order of cause to effect, because the part illuminated does not do anything on the remote opaque part.

So it is in the matter at hand. The essence of God in his own intellect makes some quiddities actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them known to the intellect; yet those quiddities have no power in respect of effecting a change in God's intellect, because God's intellect is not of a nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.

201. In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge of all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the first theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and absolutely it is about whatever all knowledge is of which does not of itself include some imperfection, because it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.

202. [On the theology of the blessed] – But, as to the created intellects of the blessed, things are otherwise, because their intellects are of a nature to be changed by the created quiddities as to knowledge of the truths included in them; and therefore, besides this theological truth that they have about the quiddities as shown in the essence of God, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by their proper motion. Therefore, the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them possible for such an intellect.

203. But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although there be some other theology about certain

knowables. Here a distinction must be made about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because they are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way, I say that it is possible for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite.⁸⁹ De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about as many things as God voluntarily shows them in his essence.

204. [On our theology] – About our theology I say that is not actually of everything, because just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit prefixed by the divine will as to general revelation is of the things that are in divine Scripture, because – as is contained in the last chapter of *Revelation* 22.18 – “he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore, our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.

205. About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, – but revelation according to common law is only of things whose terms can commonly be naturally conceived by us, – and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, according to

some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.⁹⁰

206. [On theology taken together] – However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the

relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and so the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this.

So then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and is all the knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore, the intellect of God, which cannot have any imperfect knowledge, has all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity moving the created intellect. Also theology alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded on intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image with respect to this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.⁹¹

VIII. To the Principle Arguments of the Third Question

207. To the first argument [n.140] I say that it concludes about theology not in itself but as it is handed down in Sacred Scripture.

NOTES:

⁵⁷ More properly: “But if there is a science *per se* of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the

nobler among them.”

⁵⁸ More fully: “Certainly I do not attribute to this science everything that can be known about man in human affairs, but only that whereby most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened.”

⁵⁹ Note by Scotus added before ‘the object’: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say...”

⁶⁰ [A note that Scotus cancelled here reads: “but the object is related to the habit as cause to effect; now a cause is not adequate unless it virtually contains the whole effect; therefore etc.” The note was cancelled by Scotus because of the addition just made: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object...”]

⁶¹ This opinion of Henry’s is discussed and rejected by Scotus in *Metaphysics* 6 q.1 nn.3-7.

⁶² The mark is <

⁶³ Alternative text deleted by Scotus “against this”

⁶⁴ Scotus *Metaphysics* 1 q.1, 6 q.4; *Ord.* I d.3 para 1 q.3 n.20.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* n.4.

⁶⁶ Note by Scotus: “This is valid against the opinion about Christ;” cf. n.173 below.

⁶⁷ Note by Scotus: “Note: valid against the opinion about Christ;” cf. n.173 below.

⁶⁸ Interpolation: “But if it is not about eternal things, it does not perfect the superior part of reason.”

⁶⁹ For the distinction between the divine essence and attributes, *Ord.* I d.8 q.4 nn.1-20.

⁷⁰ Cf. *Ord.* I d.8 p.1 q.4 n.24.

⁷¹ Cf. *Ord.* I d.30 q.1-2 n.14-17, *Quodl.* q.1 n.9, 14, q.8 n.20.

⁷² Cf. *Quodl.* q.8 nn.20-22.

⁷³ Interpolation: “because the intellect knowing such an object can draw out every conclusion or concept of that habit.”

⁷⁴ Interpolation: “namely, the fact that God is three and one does not get evidence from the object known, because we do not know God under the idea of God, but from elsewhere; we believe it because we find it written. Therefore, if you then find the science of geometry written, then the object of geometry would not contain the written properties as they are seen by my intellect, because the object would not be known to me under the idea of first object; therefore, such a first object should be assigned in respect of the sort of habit to which the intellect would first attribute those truths.”

⁷⁵ *Ord.* I d.2 p.1 q.2 n.34, d.3 p.1 q.1-2 n.17

⁷⁶ *Ord.* I d.3 p1 q.4 n.10, d.8 p.2 q.un n.24.

⁷⁷ Bonaventure *On the Sentences* 1 prologue q.1 in corp. (1 7b): “The subject too, to which, as to ‘the integral whole’, all the things determined in this book are reduced is Christ, insofar as he embraces the divine and human nature, or the created and the uncreated, about which are the two first books; and as he is head and members, about which are the two following books. And I take ‘integral whole’ in a broad sense, because it embraces many things not only in composition but in union and in order.”

⁷⁸ In the position of Bonaventure, see the previous footnote

⁷⁹ Again in the position of Bonaventure.

⁸⁰ Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, *The Work of Six Days* ch.1: "...And this is the one subject of this wisdom [theology] which the Savior expresses in *John* when he says: 'And that they too may be one in us'... Consider what is said, how the 'one' by which we are one with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit – which is also expressed in *John* when he says 'And that they too may be one in us' – seems to bind together in itself the 'one' of the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the 'one' of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, and the 'one' whereby we are one in Christ, and 'one' by the renewal of the Spirit of our mind with the Supreme Trinity!"

⁸¹ These seven (from the Creed) are: conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, descended into hell, rose again from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven, will come again to judge the living and the dead.

⁸² These seven articles are: I believe in one God, Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, I believe in the Holy Spirit, creator of heaven and earth, forgiveness of sins, resurrection of the body, and life everlasting.

⁸³ Interpolation: "because the artisan works on something, and in that same thing is his making received; by reason of the first the object is said to be the matter in science, not by reason of the second, because the act of a science does not pass beyond [sc. into something else]."

⁸⁴ Text canceled by Scotus: "because a consideration of attributes naturally known to us is a metaphysical consideration, unless

there be some attributes that belong per se only to this essence as this and not to it as it is now naturally known by us, namely confusedly."

⁸⁵ Interpolation: "On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31; if therefore something has principles of knowing, then it has principles of being. The principles of being are said not to be propositional but non-propositional, and from these are formed the propositions that are principles of knowing; but the first cause lacks a principle of being, though not of knowing, because some things belong to it by priority and through them are posterior things known."

⁸⁶ Interpolation: "...because the properties of being convertible with being are known in sum about any being, and more nobly of the distinct properties of being, what distributes them to belong in sum to the same thing is the noblest knowledge naturally possible of God; now the whole of this knowledge is metaphysics, because that whose job it is to consider a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property in sum of the same subject in particular."

⁸⁷ The opinion of Henry of Ghent.

⁸⁸ Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent.

⁸⁹ Interpolation: "because it alone does not include limitation about any object; but any other one, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation."

⁹⁰ Possibly a reference to the teaching of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time about the same thing, as say about the existence of God.

BL. JOHN DUNS SCOTUS OFM

⁹¹ The reference is to man as made in the image of God, as spoken of in particular by Augustine *On the Trinity* 14 ch.8 n.11, 15 ch.27 n.50.

FOURTH PART

On Theology as a Science

Questions 1 and 2: Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

208. After this I ask whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of subalterning or subalternate.

I. To the First Question

[On theology in itself and in God] – To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception and doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discourse.

These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection⁹² and also potentiality of the receiving intellect. Therefore, theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect.

209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] – But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed there is doubt.

And it seems that it is not, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps they will not there be willable,” etc., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have

science as to this fourth condition of science.

But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that can be acted on by such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make the truths included in itself known to our intellect, by parity of reasoning also as seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused discursively, because a discursive process does not require succession of time nor the order of it, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is first naturally known, and so that in this way it be causative with respect to the other term of the discursion.⁹³

This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it.

The authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert it, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect even our word may be. In like way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities in God.⁹⁴

210. [On the science of contingents as a science] – But there is another doubt in this question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things [n.150]. The thing is plain about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem that there can be science about contingents; it is plain from the definition of science [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of

theology, as it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not.

211. Here I say that in science that is of perfection which would be certain and evident knowledge;⁹⁵ but that it be about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of knowledge, because however much science be of a necessary object, it can in itself be contingent and be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems to be in itself formally more perfect than a science that requires the necessity of its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally are of a nature to have a knowledge certain and evident and, as far as depends on the part of the evidence, perpetual. This is clear, because all theological contingents are of a nature to be seen in the first theological object, and in the same object is the conjunction of those contingent truths of a nature to be seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such evident truth. As far as depends too on the part of the theological object showing them, such truths are of a nature to be seen in such perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore, contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to have a more perfect knowledge than a science acquired about necessary things.

212. But is knowledge of them be science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in *Posterior Analytics* [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know a contingent thing; however, according as the Philosopher takes science in *Ethics* 6.3.1139b15-18, as it is divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because a habit too whereby we determinately say what is true.

213. [On theology as wisdom] – More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evi-

dence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and the most perfect and highest and noblest object. But as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about contingent things seen in themselves as in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other prior things; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

II. To the Second Question

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject would be in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in it through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being.

Nor too does this science subaltern any other science to itself, because no other science takes its principles from it, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stand at knowables save at the most perfect knowable, nor stand on the same, save at it as most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than through its own movement; therefore, the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles of it as seen in the Word. But the resolution is had through the Word seen. Therefore, the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore, that vision subalterns to itself the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence.

216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of a line or a whole would more perfectly

know some immediate principle about a line or about a whole than a geometer who knows line and whole only confusedly, yet to the geometer is that immediate proposition per se known. Nor is it proved through the metaphysician's proposition, if from a confused concept the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is evident, but only the metaphysician knows the same per se known truth more perfectly; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line were known by diverse people and equally distinctly on the part of the object, albeit not with equal clarity.

So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect moved by a line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself known in another way, but in each way it is per se, although more clearly this way or that. But subalternation would require that the knowledge of the principles of a higher science be the cause of knowledge of the principles of a lower science, etc.⁹⁶

NOTES:

⁹² Interpolation: "on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect."

⁹³ Interpolation: "On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence known first."

⁹⁴ Interpolation: "The argument is made that then God would understand discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understand line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he thus understands it, but because he thus understands therefore does

line thus require to be understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However, it is not so about the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always cause of our science."

⁹⁵ Interpolation: "because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of a necessary object, rather it is intrinsic to the habit itself: not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when the same that was true before remains. Therefore, there is no science of what is absolutely contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, therefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit 'God is able to create', 'God is capable of assuming our nature'; similarly in the case of practical things, 'God is to be believed', 'God is to be loved', 'God is to be worshipped'. But of these practical necessities – besides the third – the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as 'God is Triune', others are naturally known."

⁹⁶ Interpolation: "This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? – To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. – Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according

to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. – Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore, none can be subalternate. – Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. – Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or known predicates, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. – Besides, he who has the subalternated science can have the subalternating science; in the proposed account neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; it is likewise plain second because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there, according to this sort of thing, the process is not from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.”

FIFTH PART

*On Theology insofar as it
is a Practical Science*

Question 1: Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

217. The question is whether theology is a practical or a speculative science.

Proof that it is not practical:

Because in *John* 20.23 it is said: "These things are written that you might believe;" to believe is something speculative, because on it vision follows; therefore etc.

218. Besides, practical science is posited to be about the contingent, *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 and *Ethics* 1.2.1094b7, 21-22; but the object of this science is not contingent, but necessary; therefore etc.

219. Again, Boethius *On the Trinity* ch. 2 assigns three parts to speculative science, one of which is theology according to him; and it seems he is speaking about this theology, because about its subject he there adds that its subject is the first substance, of which he says that "God's substance lacks matter."

220. Again, nobler than every practical science is some speculative science; but no science is nobler than this science [of theology]; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is both that speculative science is for its own sake while practical is for the sake of use, and that speculative science is more certain, from *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14- 16, 25-28.

221. Again, after all necessary sciences were in existence, this science was invented for escaping ignorance, as appears, because concern with necessities is an impediment to the investigation of this doctrine; therefore it is a speculative science. For in this

way does the Philosopher argue in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a19-25, that metaphysics is speculative.

222. On the contrary:

Romans 13.10: "The end of the law is love."

Again, *Matthew* 22.40: "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."

Again, Augustine *On the Praise of Charity, Sermon* 350 n.2: "He who keeps charity in morals possesses whatever is hidden and whatever is plain in the divine words."

Now these authorities prove that this science is not precisely for speculation, but speculative science seeks nothing beyond speculation, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.1.

Question 2: Whether a science is called practical per se or from order to action as to its end

223. Second, the question is whether a science is called practical *per se* from order to action [praxis] as to its end.

I argue that it is:

In *On the Soul* 3.10 433a14-15 the Philosopher says: “The intellect becomes practical by extension, and differs from the speculative in its end.”

224. Again in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14-16: “The practical is less noble than the speculative, because it is for the sake of use.” This argument would not hold unless use was the end *per se* of that habit.

225. Again in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 he says: “The end of the speculative is truth, but the end of the practical is work.”

226. On the contrary:

In *Metaphysics* 6.1.10225b18-28 the Philosopher distinguishes practical sciences from speculative by their objects, as is plain; for he there distinguishes practical science, both active and productive, from speculative by its object and not by its end.

Again, in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a3-15 he distinguishes the calculative from the scientific by the necessary and contingent object; therefore science is practical *per se* from its object; therefore not from action as from its end.

Again, in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 he assigns good as the

object of the practical, not any good but doable and contingent good; therefore, science is practical *per se* from its object; not therefore from action as from its end.

227. To solve these questions I take one general thing that is conceded by everyone, namely that the practical habit is in some way extended to action. One must consider therefore in particular: first, what the action is to which practical knowledge is said to be extended; second, in what way practical knowledge is extended to that action; third, by what knowledge has such extension.

I. What Action [Praxis] is

228. I say first, then, that the action to which practical knowledge is extended is the act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right intellection so as to be right.

The first condition is clear, because when standing precisely on acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not tend outside itself save as its act has regard to the act of another power.

And if you say that one act of the intellect is extended to another, being directed by it, the second act is not for this reason action as we are now speaking of action, nor is the first act practical knowledge, because then logic would be practical, because it directs in acts of discursive thought.

229. The second condition is plain, because acts not having an order to the intellect, of which sort are vegetative acts and acts naturally preceding the intellect, as sense acts, are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge said to be extended to them as they are prior to understanding. Similarly, the act of the power of sense appetite, insofar as it precedes the act of the intellect, is

not action; for in this way it is common to us and the brutes. Nor is any knowledge practical in respect of these acts, save because it moderates these acts in some way and these acts follow the intellection moderative of them as they are moderated by it.

230. From these two conditions follows a corollary, namely that the action to which the practical habit is extended is only an elicited or commanded act of the will, for no other act from intellection or beside intellection is essentially posterior to intellection, for let any other act be given of the same idea as it is, it could be prior, as is plain by running through the acts of all the powers.

231. This is plain secondly thus: because action is an act that is in the power of the knower. The proof is from *Ethics* 6.5.1140b22, because an artisan needs a virtue for acting rightly; but he does not need a virtue with respect to what is not in his power; therefore an artisan has the act of making in his power; much more does the prudent man have action in his power, because he is formally virtuous. From this follows further: if all action is in the power of the knower and nothing is in the power of the will save either an elicited or commanded act, the proposed conclusion follows as before [n.230].

232. Against this condition: it seems that then some intellection will be action, because some intellection can be an act commanded by the will just as the act of another power is commanded by it. And then further: therefore the first condition is false, namely that action is the operation of a power other than the intellect. – I reply: although speculation be a certain operation and so action in an extended sense, yet in the way action is said to be the only operation to which the intellect can be extended, no understanding is action; and in this way is action taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When, therefore, it is argued that ‘understanding is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, this does not follow, but what

follows is ‘therefore it is action or practical’; for it is of a nature to be as it were accidentally denominated by the action to which it is extendable, but it cannot be the term of such extension. However, conversely, I do well concede that all action is an elicited or commanded act of the will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first is to commit the fallacy of the consequent, by positing the consequent.⁹⁷

233. Proof of the third condition. First from the remark of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a22-25, that right choice necessarily requires right reason. This remark is not only true of choice taken strictly but, by parity of reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited; but all action either is volition or follows volition, from the preceding corollary [n.230]; therefore all action, in order for it to be right, is naturally elicited in conformity with right reason. Second from the remark of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.10, ch.7 n.13, that the intellect understands for itself and for other powers. Therefore, just as it can judge about its own act, so can it about the acts of other powers; therefore, it can about an act naturally posterior to its own act naturally judge before that act be elicited; and consequently, if it judge rightly, that act must be elicited in conformity with that judgment if it ought to be right.

From the two final conditions of action [nn.228, 229, 233] it follows that an act commanded by the will is not primarily action but as it were *per accidens*, because neither is it first posterior to intellection nor is it first of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason. Some other act, then, must be action first; that act is only volition, because through volition the commanded act has the said conditions; therefore the first idea of action is saved in an elicited act of the will.

And then further: whenever something is first of such a sort when conjoined with another, it would still be of such a sort if

it could be separated from that other; therefore if an act of will can be separated from the act of another power, it will be action when separated from that posterior act. But it is separated with respect to anything that can be the object of an act of will with respect to which there cannot be an act of another power, of which sort are all immaterial things; therefore about every such thing there is an act of will, and it on its own is action.

235. Second, the same is proved from the intention of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.10.433a17-18, where he inquires about the motive principle and, after he has concluded that there are two motive principles namely will or appetite and reason, he subjoins: “The intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite.” And consequently he says that the two appetites are sometimes contrary to each other: so it is to posit as it were one mover in species, because common to the two appetites is the idea of the intermediate species, namely the idea of appetite. Therefore he expressly means that just as the sense appetite has the idea of a motive principle along with sense and imagination, so the will has the idea of a motive principle along with intellect and reason. Therefore, just as an act of sense appetite without any transition to what is extrinsic is truly action when it follows an act of intellect, so an act of will, which is posited to be equally a motive principle, will truly be action, for it always follows an act of intellect; and this act too if it be on its own without a commanded act, nay if it be with an act in sense appetite opposed to the act which it would command, because it is, as having that sometimes opposed appetite, a motive and operative principle, whose operation is action.

II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

236. From this article [nn.228-235] the second [n.227] is plain, for this extension consists in a double aptitudinal relation,

namely of conformity and natural priority; as to priority, the thing is plain from what has already been adduced from the *Ethics* [nn.231, 233]; about conformity there is what is had in the same place, when he says that “truth of practical consideration is being confessedly disposed to correct appetite.”

237. I said ‘aptitudinal’ because neither relation is required to be actual. For the fact that an action actually follow the consideration that is conform to the consideration, this is altogether accidental to the consideration and contingent;⁹⁸ for if it were called action from actual extension, no action would be necessarily practical, but the same action would sometimes be practical, sometimes theoretical, which nothing is; therefore a double aptitudinal extension or aptitude for extension is enough.⁹⁹

This is made clear because practical knowledge is commonly conceded to be extended to action as directive to directed or as regulative to regulated. But knowledge’s being naturally prior to action and conformed to it is not its being conformed to action as to something prior, but its being conformative of action as of something posterior, or its being what action must be conformed to, which is for knowledge to direct and rule in action. And as to whether thus directing or conforming action to itself is some efficacy in knowledge with respect to action, see *Ord.* II Suppl. 25 q. un.

238. From this second point it is plain that the practical and speculative are not essential differences of habit or science or knowledge in general, because ‘practical’ asserts a double aptitudinal respect of knowledge (which is as it were something absolute) to an action as to its term, and the speculative takes away that double respect; but neither the respect nor its privation are of the essence of the absolute, but is as it were a division of the genus through the proper properties of the species, just as if number were divided into odd and even, and line into straight

and curved. For to one knowledge the practical *per se* in the second mode belongs from the intrinsic cause of the predicate in the subject, and to another the speculative.¹⁰⁰

III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

239. [First opinion] – About the third article [n.227] there are opinions of which one is of this sort, that the intellect is called practical from one thing, and the act or habit from another. It is as follows: truth that is doable and that is not doable are specific objects, formally diverse, so they distinguish *per se* the things that *per se* have a respect to them, namely act and habit, which are called practical because they concern something doable. But the intellect is only called practical if it be operative, of which sort is only the intellect that apprehends order to a work – which it does not do unless moved by appetite for the end, such that the practical intellect includes in its act, not formally by the essence of the act but by connotation, an order that is necessarily toward desire explicitly of the end and implicitly of the things for the end; wherefore, since the ordering of what is speculable to a work is accidental to what is speculable (though its being orderable is not accidental to it), the difference between the speculative and the practical intellect proceeding from this will be accidental and in respect of something outside the intellect, although the difference of habits and acts is formal according to the formal difference of doable and non-doable object. Hence in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a14-15 it is said that the speculative and practical intellect differ in their end, and in *Ethics* 6.3.1139a29-31 that: “The good of the practical intellect is truth disposed conformably to right appetite.”

240. An example: the speculative intellect apprehends health as a fitting good, the appetite desires it, and there follows in some way the consideration of the practical intellect that health is to

be acquired. With the desire for the end in place, then, the practical intellect proceeds discursively from the principle ‘that by which health can be better acquired is to be procured’, and its discursive process ends at the final conclusion of deliberation; and this whole discursive process, just as it takes its principle from apprehension of the desired end, which is the first object of the practical intellect, so it is that it does what has been discovered for the end, and therefore it presupposes will of the end and is ordered to the choice that follows deliberation.

241. Against this opinion – which, to speak briefly, consists in this, that it puts the distinction of the practical and speculative intellect in an end that is accidental to the object, but the speculative and practical habit differ and are distinguished by the formal difference of their special objects – the argument is that it is said of habits in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21: “The end of the speculative is truth, but of the practical a work.”

242. Likewise, the practical habit will in that case be in the speculative intellect, nor will the intellect be called practical by that habit, which seems unacceptable, because by every habit is that denominated which has it according to the nature of the habit.

243. They reply to the first argument [n.241] that the end of practical science is a work in potency and aptitude, insofar as its object is doable *per se*; but a doable object is considered according to this habit in general, which consideration is not enough for it to be subject to operation in act and in particular; because act is better than potency in good things, therefore is such a particular and actual consideration required; but the consideration is by a habit other than practical science, and that other habit is only in the practical intellect.

To the second argument [n.242] the response is that it can be denominatively called practical, not simply but by understand-

ing the denomination to be done by the habit

244. On the contrary: therefore, the practical habit and act can be in the speculative intellect, because a habit or act practical of its nature can be in the intellect without such relation to an act of will of the sort it [this opinion] posits.

It would concede the consequent, but it would posit that another habit can be had in the practical intellect, generated from acts not only practical but from acts of the practical intellect.

245. On the contrary: a practical habit generated from practical acts would be enough for the same things for which the other habit would be enough that is generated by acts of the practical intellect, because the will that commands consideration for the sake of such an end does not give any other reason for consideration in directing, nor consequently for a habit generated by considerations.

246. Again, then many accidents of the same species will be in the same thing. For not on account of order or non-order of the will can a specific distinction be posited between this act and that, and similarly not between habits either.

247. Again, third, against the opinion in itself [nn.239-240] I argue thus: a subject is more denominated by a *per se* and essential condition of its accident than from an accidental condition of it; therefore, if the intellect can be called practical from an accidental condition of its habit, to wit from an order of the will ordering its act to something else, much more can it be called practical from the essential order of the act by which the act is said to be essentially practical. Therefore, the intellect seems to be called practical from the same thing from which the habit and act seem to be, although it not be said as accidentally of the habit and act as it is said of the intellect, with respect to which it is an accident *per accidens*.

248. [Second opinion] – In another way it is said that that from which habit and act are said to be practical is the end and the extension of practical knowledge to action, which is an extension to an end.

On behalf of this opinion are the authorities set down earlier [nn.223-225].

249. There is also argument by reason. First as follows, because a habit is said to be practical either from the object or from the end. Not from the proper object because the intellect 'is made practical by extension',¹⁰¹ which is not true save of the same intellect that is speculative and afterwards practical when extended to a work; therefore there can be a speculative and a practical consideration about the same object.

250. Second thus, because medicine is divided into speculative and practical, and yet it is about some same object, as about health or the body capable of health.

251. Again, an act is said to be practical because it is morally good or bad; goodness and badness of morals belong to an act from its circumstances; but among circumstances first and chief is the circumstance of the end; therefore etc.

252. Against this position I argue as follows: I ask, are habit and act said to be practical because of actual extension to a work or only because of an aptitudinal or habitual extension to a work? Not because of actual extension (as is had in the second article [nn.236-238] and as they concede), because then a workman when not intending to work would not have practical knowledge; therefore because of aptitudinal extension. But an aptitude does not belong to one nature which is repugnant to another save because of something absolute in such nature; for because this nature is such, for that reason does such aptitude belong to it; therefore it presupposes in the very consideration

some intrinsic condition by which such aptitude belongs to it. This condition of consideration in itself is from another cause prior to it; but the prior causes of it are intellect and the object; therefore, the condition belongs to it from the intellect or some object.

253. If it be said that the end is the prior cause, rather the first among all causes, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (94va), and so from it can there be consideration of such a nature that such an aptitude belong to it, on the contrary: the end is not a cause save insofar as moving, when loved and desired, the efficient cause to causing the effect. But the said aptitude belongs to consideration whether the end is loved or not. For the said knowledge can be in the intellect however the will be disposed, nay if the will were not conjoined with the intellect. And so by the end as by the final cause the aptitude does not belong to knowledge; for nothing is present from some cause that is present when the cause is not causing.

If you say that the end is apt to be loved before the aptitude is present in knowledge, on the contrary: this does not save what is proposed, because an effect has nothing from something causally because that something were of a nature to cause, unless it do actually cause; therefore knowledge does not get an aptitude, or the nature that such aptitude follows, from an end that is apt to cause, unless it do actually cause; nor does it actually cause as a final cause unless, as actually loved and desired, it move the efficient cause to acting; therefore etc.

254. Besides, the end either as elicited or had extrinsically makes the habit to be practical, or as considered and intended. Not as extrinsically elicited because thus it is posterior to the habit and in some way an effect; but an effect does not distinguish a cause. If as known, it thus has the idea of an object; therefore the object does the distinguishing. If as intended, this has already been refuted [n.253], because there is such knowledge before the end be

naturally intended.¹⁰²

255. Besides, not every end of practical knowledge is action. For some practical intellection is in respect of the action of a lower power, as for example of sense appetite or the motive power; but no act of a lower power is the end of an act of intellect, because nothing less noble is *per se* the end of the more noble; the act of understanding is nobler and more perfect than any act of any lower sense power.

256. It is said that, although intellection is nobler in being of nature than the operation of a lower power, yet not in the genus of morals, because it is morally better to act bravely than to think of acting bravely.

257. Against this in two ways. First, because it supposes something false, for the act of a lower power is not morally good save because it is conformed to right reason as to its rule; therefore rectitude of reason is the cause of such goodness in that act and not conversely; but the act of reason being thus right is its being good morally, just as intellection can be good morally. – The reason is confirmed because prudence is simply better than moral virtue as moral virtue is in sense appetite; therefore too the act of the former as it is the former's is better than the act of the latter as it is the latter's; therefore the former as practical, in the way that intellection can be practical is better than the latter is as practical or as good morally. From this it is plain that the proof about thinking is not valid; for when the excellence of one thing over another is being asked about, the best should not be compared to the lowest, but the best should be compared to the best or the simply so to the simply so. Therefore, just as it takes the best there, namely 'to act bravely externally', so should it take it in the intellect, 'to command acting bravely in accordance with prudence'. This second is better also morally, because as being the rule it has formal goodness, which is rectitude proper; the other is only good materially, because it is not of itself mor-

ally good when one circumscribes its order to this rule and to the will commanding.

258. Second, the first response [n.256] does not seem to be to the purpose: for it is asking whence intellection is practical when not supposing it to be practical, especially since neither is supposition made about the first circumstance, which is the end, but it is being inquired into [n.248]; therefore, although the question is being asked about practical intellection and about the first circumstance by which it would be practical, it is only being taken as it is what it is in being of nature, so thus to distinguish it according to goodness of morals and of nature is nothing else than to suppose what is being asked for, and to distinguish something as it is considered precisely under one member of the distinction.

259. Therefore this opinion [n.248] is corrected by others and it is said that a habit is called practical from the end, which is practical consideration; for the proper end of any habit at all is its act. – But against this: If this consideration, which is the end of the habit, is practical, then it has a cause from which it is called practical; either then the cause is the end of that consideration, and this has already been refuted [nn.252-255]; or it is the object, and then it follows that the object is the cause, prior to the consideration, whereby the habit is said to be practical, and the proposed conclusion is got that by the object are both the habit, though mediately, and the act said to be practical.

260. [Scotus' own opinion] – I concede, then, that the habit is not called practical by its proper act, because it too is practical by a prior cause. Nor is any habitual or actual knowledge practical *per se* because it is ordered to action as to an end; yet it can sometimes get its first extension, namely conformity to action [n.236], from the end of the action, not however insofar as it is end but insofar as it is object.

261. The first point here [about first extension] is plain. For sometimes the first practical principles are taken from the end of action, and so the end, as first cause of action, includes virtually all the knowledge in the genus, and so the knowledge itself gets from it its quiddity and aptitude.

262. The second point [about the end as object] is plain. For practice gives the aptitude, or the sort of nature possessing the aptitude, for this reason, because as first object it includes the principles and, by means of them, the conclusions, so it includes the whole of practical knowledge; but not insofar as it is end: first because from the end as end is no nature or natural aptitude got unless the end is loved and desired and so is moving the efficient cause [n.253]; but before it is naturally loved it includes the said principles and conclusions; for the truth of a necessary practical principle does not depend more on the will than does the truth of a speculative principle, nor do the conclusions necessarily inferred from such a principle; – second because anything else that would virtually include such knowledge would in the same way give such conformity to the knowledge, to wit if the action itself were first in the genus to include such knowledge, or that which the operation is about, as sometimes happens and as was touched on in the response to the third argument in the first question about the subject of theology [n.185]; for man is perhaps the subject of both moral and medical science – but happiness or health is not – because the idea of the end of each is included in the idea of what the action is about.

263. If it be said that the first practical principles are always taken from the end, therefore the end always first includes the knowledge of them virtually, – if the conclusion were conceded, yet it would hold not insofar as it was end but insofar as it was object, and then it could be said that man is the end both of health and of natural happiness, as was touched on in the preceding response [n.262]; but man is not at any rate the prox-

imate end of action, because, if the conclusion were denied, the antecedent taken universally would have to be denied, for taken particularly it is true, namely when the idea of the end is not deduced from anything pertaining to practical knowledge [n.314].

264. Or the antecedent could be expounded in another way thus: 'the first principles [are always taken from the end]' is true among principles that are taken from the moral circumstances on the presupposition of an act good in its kind, because thus is the object not a circumstance. In another way, when taking the act bare, the object too is a circumstance; and by this the antecedent seems to be refuted: for that from which is taken the altogether first circumstance of the act considered bare seems to be prior to anything else, and thus the object by which the act is first specified so as to be called good in kind of act (being qualifiable further by the other circumstances so as to be fully moral), seems to be altogether first in practical knowledge. But it is not necessary now to pursue the question whether this conclusion holds or not, because its place is in the third book (*Ord.* III Suppl. d.26 q. un. n.10; d.38 q. un. nn.4-5; also II d.7 q. un. nn.11-13, 24-28; d.40 q. un. n.3) [cf. n.362]).

Briefly then as to this article [nn.239, 227], I say that practical knowledge does not first get the extension belonging to it from the end insofar as it is end, for the reasons adduced above [n.262].

IV. To the Second Question

265. From this the solution is plain to the second question posed [n.223], whose negative part I hold [sc. science is *not* said to be practical from its order to the end], but the first relation, namely conformity [n.236], it has *per se* from the object, which is either rectitude of practice or something virtually including that rectitude, and therefore action is conformable to that knowledge so as to be right, because knowledge is of such known thing.

266. But as to the other relation, namely priority [n.236], it is doubtful whence it belongs to knowledge. I say that necessarily some intellection naturally precedes action, as is plain from the first article [nn.229-233]; and in this respect posteriority belongs to action and priority to knowledge from the idea of the powers that are ordered naturally in acting, namely intellect and will. But that prior intellection is not always practical, but only when it is determinative of rectitude or of the determinate rectitude of the action, and that either virtually or formally. But when there is in the preceding apprehension no virtual or formal determination about the rectitude of the action, although there be priority there, yet conformity there is lacking, because it is not the knowledge to which action should be conformed in order to be right, because it shows nothing determinate about the rectitude of action.¹⁰³

It can then be said that, although absolutely from the nature of the intellect and of the will knowledge is prior, yet the fact that conform knowledge, that is, conformative knowledge [n.237], is prior, this comes at the same time from the object and from the order of the powers and of the acting power, for although the object determine the intellect to knowledge of rectitude naturally before the will wills, and although the will in some way receives its rule from elsewhere, yet not apprehension alone but conform apprehension precedes action. But this happens whenever the determinate rectitude of action is a necessary knowable, either as a principle through the intellect or as a conclusion through science.

267. The things that have now been said, namely about whence the double relation, that is of conformity and of priority, belongs to practical knowledge, they are to be understood in a general way, unless it be necessary to add something on behalf of the divine intellect, namely that the acting power, to whose action the conform knowledge is prior, be in some way determinable,

or conformable to another as to a rule in its acting, from somewhere else; which, whether this be required for knowledge or not, will be touched on in response to the fourth objection that will be made against the principal solution of the question [nn.324-331].

268. But when determinate rectitude belongs contingently to action, then there is no object determining the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude before the will wills, and this when speaking of intellect and will in general, for the contingent thing is not determined to either part in advance of every act of the will. But when making comparison specifically to this intellect and this will, the conform knowledge, which determinate knowledge of rectitude precedes, can precede the action, and the one which it does not precede cannot; but it can precede in all and only the intelligence whose will is not the first determinant of rectitude for the action.

269. An example of what has been said:

The rectitude of this act 'to love God' is necessary and is included in the idea of God virtually; this action is also not only of a nature to be preceded in every intelligence by apprehension, but also by conform apprehension, namely the apprehension to which the action must be conformed so as to be right; so it is from the object which of itself primarily determines the intellect to know the determinate rectitude of the action, and from the order of the intellect and the will in acting, that this knowledge is obtained which is prior to action and conform, and thus in any other action that determinate rectitude necessarily belongs to.

But the rectitude of this action 'to worship God in the sacrifice of the altar' is contingent; for sometimes the act is right, as it is now, and sometimes not, as it was in the Old Testament; and therefore there is not any object determinative of the intellect to knowledge of this rectitude in advance of every act of the will,

and so neither does the knowledge precede, as conform knowledge, every act of the will. Yet it does precede the act of some will, to wit of that will alone which does not first determine rectitude for this action, of which sort is the human will. For this rectitude is determined by the divine will, which accepts now this sort of cult or act, and at another time another one.

V. To the First Question

A. The Opinion of Others

270. Now that these points have been seen, it is necessary to respond to the first question [n.217], where there are five ways holding the negative side of the question [sc. that theology is *not* a practical science].

[First way] – One way speaks thus, declaring that there is a double act of the will, one perfecting the will, the other being perfected by it, as is maintained by Henry of Ghent in his *Summa* and see it in a.8 q.3 ad3.¹⁰⁴

271. For this way there is the authority of Augustine in his sermon *On Jacob and Esau* (Sermon 88 ch.5 n.6): "All our works," he says, "are for the purpose of purifying the eye whereby God is seen."

272. Again, it can be argued thus: something directive is not required save where there can be error; practical science is directive, therefore the science of the blessed is not practical, because the blessed cannot err; therefore, neither is our science practical, because it is the same as that of the blessed.

273. Again, it can be argued according to his understanding elsewhere [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.36 q.4]: God does not have practical science; but he most of all or alone has this science; therefore etc.

274. Against this I argue, and first I lead the idea of their position to the opposite, in four ways. First thus: although the will cannot err about the end displayed in a universal way, yet it can err about the end displayed in a particular way; therefore, in order for it to act rightly about the end displayed in a particular way, direction is required. The showing of the end in theology is of the end not universally but in particular, because the showing of it universally belongs to the metaphysician.¹⁰⁵

275. Further, a directive habit is not posited because of the substance of an act but because of its circumstance, as temperance is not posited because of the substance of the act of eating, or of another act of the sort, but because of its circumstance; therefore, although the will were determined to the substance of an act tending to the end in particular, yet direction would be required as to the circumstances of the act, to which the direction that is about the substance of the act does not extend. – From these two reasons the argument is made that wherever it is possible in action to err and to act rightly, there practical knowledge is necessary for giving direction; in this action, which is love of the end as it pertains to theology, error happens in two ways, as the reasons show, both by reason of the object in particular and by reason of the circumstances of the act; therefore etc.

276. Further, third: that of which the love is principally intended outside the genus of knowledge, of that the knowledge is principally intended inside the genus of knowledge; but love of the end for them is principally intended outside the genus of knowledge; therefore, knowledge of the end is principally intended inside the genus of knowledge. But in any science is principally intended knowledge of the first subject of it, therefore the end is the principal subject of this science. From the end are taken practical principles; but practical principles conclude to practical conclusions; therefore this science, which first intends love of the end outside the genus of knowledge, is practical.

277. Further, to the same genus, according to action or speculation, belong the principles and conclusions; for practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles, not speculative ones; therefore since knowledge of the end is directive in acts about what is for the end, and since knowledge of what is for the end is a sort of conclusion concluded in knowledge of the end as of a sort of principle, then if knowledge of what is for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions, the knowledge of the end will be practical, because it is of a practical principle.

Thus is plain the response to this way's first reason [n.270], because it takes what is false (as though the will were determinate of itself), which the first two reasons prove [nn.274-275]. Likewise, if the will were determinate, yet still the knowledge would be practical, as the two final reasons prove [nn.276-277].

278. To the authority they appeal to [n.271] (it seems to conclude that the vision of God is the end of this science, which they do not concede) I reply that the authority is speaking of these external operations, which are fastings, vigils, and prayers; yet any external act is of a nature to be conformed to any interior act by which it has its goodness, and also of a nature to be ordered to some interior act, and finally to an act of willing.

279. To the third [n.272] I reply: an agent intends *per se* to induce a form and does not intend the removal of a contrary save *per accidens*. Thus, a habit *per se* directs, but it *per accidens* excludes error; and if the habit is perfect it is not compatible with error, nay if it is compatible it is not perfect. Therefore, although the blessed be not able to err, it does not follow that they do not have also a directive habit, because, if it were *per impossibile* removed, they could err, but once it is posited, all error, because of the perfection of it, is excluded.

280. Discussion of the fourth [n.273] will be given below, after the solution of this first question, by solving the fourth objec-

tion against it [nn.324-331].

281. [Second way (n.270)] – The second way, although it could rightly and not rightly be elicited, yet denies that love of the end is action because it is not about a contingent object. For the Commentator says on the *Ethics* [Eustratius, *Explanations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 1 ch.1 3E] that action is operation according to choice; choice is only about the contingent, from *Ethics* 3.4.1111b29-30, because it is deliberative appetite; deliberation is only about the contingent (*Ethics* 3.5.1112a21-22, 30-31). From this too is the description of action posited in the first article of the solution [n.228] proved to be insufficient, because it omits the precise object. Consequently, this way says that no knowledge is practical that is extended to volition of the final end alone, because this end is not a true contingent.

282. Against this way is the fourth reason set down against the preceding one [n.277].

Again, in truth action is that operation to which appetitive virtue inclines, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, from *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, and choice is action, as will be shown against the third way directly [nn.287-289]; but to love of the end not only does charity incline but also acquired love, which is appetitive virtue, because the acquired habit or appetite is in agreement with right reason.

The motive for this way will be solved in the solution of the second principal reason for the first question [nn.346-351].

283. [Third way (n.270)] – The third way posits that either volition is not properly action but only the act posterior to it is, or if it is action, it is not so save in order to some commanded act of a lower power, to wit of the sense appetitive or the motive power or the like.

284. For this third way it is argued that all action follows choice.

The proof is from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a31-32: “The principle of an act is choice, not for the sake of which, but the source of motion,” that is, not the final principle but the effective one; the effective principle naturally precedes the effect; therefore etc.

285. Further, a practical habit is generated from actions; but a practical habit is generated from acts that follow choice; therefore, they are actions.

286. Again, the Commentator on the *Ethics* [Eustratius, *id.* 1 ch.1 3E] says: “Action is operation in accord with choice;” therefore action follows choice.

287. Against this, that not only an act which follows choice is action, the proof is because in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a33-34 the Philosopher says that choice is not right without right reason and the habit of virtue; therefore virtue is *per se* required for right choice; but it would not be required if it were a habit generated from acts posterior to choice, because it would not then incline *per se* save to the acts posterior to choice. Therefore, the argument proceeds under another form, because a habit is generated from the same acts to which it inclines, from *Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-23; but moral virtue *per se* inclines to right choice, because, as is clear from its definition in *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, virtue is “a habit of choice” etc.; therefore moral virtue is *per se* generated from choices, and as a result not only the acts following choice are actions.

288. Further, not only is it false to deny that choice is action, which is argued by the reason just given, but, as was proved in the first article [nn.230, 234], an elicited act of the will is first action, and a commanded act is so only because of it; therefore if a choice be on its own, without order to commanding an act, to wit because of the lack of matter for the external act, it alone will be truly action. This is made clear thus: someone without money, to whom however money is presented in imagination

before the choice of any action be an effective principle or a principle for commanding someone, if he choose to distribute the money liberally were he to have it, then, as to the act and habit of virtue, no further prosecution [of the act] or distribution is required, because when some object has been presented in imagination that there could be an act of liberality about, the choice is had completely from which liberality is generated or which is elicited from liberality; nor is there required any further prosecution [of the act], or anything external, or any order to what is external, if the matter of the external act be lacking.

289. Further, this order can only be of a cause for causing the 'because' of the effect; but it seems unacceptable that a cause in itself not be of itself such as is prior to the effect but only because it is actually ordered to bringing about the effect, since a cause gets nothing from the effect, nor from its order to the effect.

290. Then to the authority from the *Ethics* [n.284] I say that in the same place the Philosopher at once adds: "But of choice (supply: the principles are) appetite and reason that are for the sake of something" (that is, practical). Also, in order for choice to be right, virtue is required in appetite; hence there follows: "Choice (namely right choice) is not without moral habit." Therefore, virtue has an elicited act more immediate to it than the act of which choice is principle as giving command; for the elicited act of the will, which is choice, is a good act before the external act commanded by good choice is good. The proof is given by the Philosopher; for he immediately adds (after the remark 'nor is choice without a habit'): "For a good act is not without custom." But if this is the major premise to prove what he said before about choice, let this minor premise be assumed under it, 'good choice is a good act'. I concede, therefore, the authority that affirms choice to be the principle 'from which' of an act, because an act commanded by choice is also a moral act; but from this it does not follow that it alone is an act or action, nay rather choice is a prior action, on account of which it too is a good action.

291. To the second [n.285], if the major is true, I say that a practical habit is generated from choices, as was said above about someone choosing frequently to give liberally [n.288]; even without the commanded act, should the means not be available, liberality can be generated in him. But because, when the commanded acts are impossible, the will does not commonly choose rightly often about the matter of these acts – because that which is believed impossible for someone either he does not will or wills weakly, according to Augustine [*On the Trinity* X.1 n.2] – therefore commonly the practical habit which is virtue is not generated without the commanded actions subsequent to the choices; it is however not generated from those subsequent actions but from the choices, where moral goodness exists formally; in commanded actions it only exists materially.

292. To the third [n.286], to the Commentator, it is necessary that the 'according to' not be there an indication of efficient cause if the description has to be convertible with the thing described, as was already proved by Aristotle in the *Ethics* [n.290]; but the 'according to' must be understood effectively or formally, or let choice there be taken for liberality or for controlling power, or let choice be taken for the eliciting of an act of willing which is not choice or any volition. But every action [praxis] is action in the genus of action in accord with the choice, as though in accord with its active principle, whether the action be choice or what follows choice, because action in the genus of action is reduced to an effective principle.

293. These three ways [nn.270, 281, 283] posit that theology is purely speculative, notwithstanding the fact that it be extended to love of the end – whether the will is as it were naturally determined to that when a showing of it precedes [n.270], or whether the will is freely and contingently related to it (not however about a contingent and doable object [n.281]), or third whether it is related in any way at all about any object at all, not however by

doing it, that is, not however in its order to the commanded act, but by stopping at the first elicited act [n.283].

294. But that such extension does not prove it is practical is persuasive because then any knowledge would be practical, because some delight or love accompanies any knowledge at all.

295. Likewise in *Ethics* 10.9.1179a22-24, the happy man “is most dear to God,” and yet the Philosopher posits that happiness to be speculative and not practical.

296. Against this conclusion, common to these ways, it seems to follow that there is some operation in the power of man such that it is truly a human act and yet is not properly speculation or action, to wit love of the end; the consequent seems unacceptable.

297. Further, that directive knowledge in any volition is not practical, since ‘truth is agreement with right appetite’, seems unacceptable, because such truth is the proper work of the practical mind, from *Ethics* 6.3.1139a29-31.

298. What is added about delight [n.294] is nothing to the purpose, because since delight is a passion naturally consequent to perfect operation, whether it be about the speculation or the thing speculated about, from this is no practical knowledge posited because of extension to delight, because neither is it action properly speaking; this will be touched on in *Ord.* III Suppl. d.15 q. un. But to love and desire a known object, and this circumstanced in such or such way, is truly action, nor is it naturally consequent to apprehension but is can freely be rightly or not rightly elicited.

299. What is added about the happy contemplative, that he is most dear to God [n.295], is not made compelling by the authority, for it speaks passively as it were, the happy man ‘is most loved by God’, not actively, as is plain there; for it adds: “if the

gods have any care for human things, it is reasonable that they (supply ‘the gods’) take joy in what is best and most like them; but this is the intellect,” and then: “to those therefore who love this (that is, the intellect) it will be reasonable for the gods to give reward, as to their friends,” etc.

300. But, setting that authority aside, is it the case that the happy contemplative is most loving according to Aristotle in the way that to love is distinguished from to be delighted, whether about the object speculated on or about the speculation? – I reply: in *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b3 he holds the first mover moves as something loved; therefore a lower intelligence loves the first mover, and yet he would place its happiness in speculation, as is plain from *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-32; therefore he himself comprehends under speculation not only delight but loving. Therefore, neither because of extension to that will the knowledge be practical, according to him, but speculative.

301. But why then is he not held to this result, since the idea of practical and of speculative science is adopted by him? – and so the first two ways, denying it [sc. that theology is practical] in positing theology to be speculative, do well posit it, even according to the Philosopher – I reply: the ‘to love’ that he would posit in the intelligence he would posit to be in the will by natural necessity, so that it would not happen there that it errs and acts rightly, so that, with respect to it, the knowledge would be only ostensive, not directive, either as to the object in particular or as to any condition of it or any circumstance of the act of willing.

302. The theologians would not speak in this way about the act of love of intelligible creatures in regard to God in particular and as to the circumstances of the act, as was argued against the first way in the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. If therefore he [= the Philosopher] had agreed with us, positing that loving the end can freely and rightly and not rightly be elicited, and that it cannot be rightly elicited unless it is elicited in conform-

ity with a right reason not only showing the object but also bidding it to be thus elicited, perhaps he would, with respect to such, have posited a practical knowledge, because a knowledge in agreement with right appetite. Therefore, it is better for the theologian, who must disagree with him in the minor premise, by consequently saying he disagrees in the conclusion, than to agree in the conclusion that he himself [= the Philosopher] would not posit if he were not holding the minor along with the theologian.¹⁰⁶

When, therefore, you say that we get from him the idea of practical and speculative, it is true, and we agree in the major premise that it [= theology] is speculative, which although it were extended to love as pointing out the object, yet in no way would it be directive in the act as it can be circumstanced or as it is of this object in particular; but the minor that he himself assumes under the major we have to deny in the case at hand.¹⁰⁷

303. [Fourth way] – And therefore there is a fourth way, which says that theology is affective. Which can be understood in a good way if affective is set down as something practical; but if it is set down as a third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, it is in this way contrary to what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is truly action [nn.228-235], and also against many authorities that believe precisely that science is divided into the practical and the speculative, and there is no third member.

304. [Fifth way] – The fifth way says that theology is contemplative. For this way Augustine is adduced in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.14 n.22, where his meaning is that wisdom is in respect of contemplation, science in respect of action; since, therefore, theology is properly wisdom and not science, it will not be practical but contemplative.

I reply that Augustine in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.4 n.4 says that

the two parts of the soul, the superior and the inferior, are only distinguished according to their functions; and in each there is a trinity (but in the superior the image of the Trinity), and yet only the superior is contemplative, because it has regard to things eternal. Therefore, the contemplation of which he speaks is not distinguished from speculation within the genus of science; for the contemplative contains memory, intelligence, and will, and so in the contemplative there can be an extension outside the genus of science, just as there can be in the active, that is, in the inferior part, which regards temporal things, and it too contains a trinity. If then it is contemplative as Augustine speaks there, it is not for this reason prevented from being practical if it is extended to practice in the superior part.

305. [Another opinion] There is another opinion, discordant from the preceding ones in its conclusion that science is speculative and practical. The proof for it is twofold. One way is as follows: just as a teaching in which there are some things written about law and other things about philosophy would be speculative and practical, whether they were written in separate books or intertwined and mixed, so too in this teaching [of theology] speculative and practical things are treated of together, not in separate books and chapters but intertwined and mixed; therefore it is speculative and practical.

306. Again it is proved in this way, because no speculative knowledge treats more distinctly of doable things than the knowledge of them is necessary for speculation, nor does any practical science treat more distinctly of things to speculate than is required the knowledge of them because of the action it is extended to; this science treats more distinctly of doable things than is the knowledge of them necessary for speculation, and more distinctly of things to speculate than is the knowledge of them required for practical knowledge; therefore it is speculative and practical. – The major is plain, because things to speculate are considered in practical science only on account of practical con-

sideration, and doable things are considered in speculative science only on account of speculative consideration. The minor is plain, because this science treats of doable things as distinctly as if it were precisely about them, and of things to speculate as distinctly as if it were precisely about them.

307. Against this it is argued as follows: a habit that does not get evidence from its object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects (for then it would be necessary to posit two infused faiths); this habit [of theology] does not get evidence from its object, therefore it is not distinguished according to distinction of objects; therefore it is not two habits because of the distinction between things to do and things to speculate.

308. Further, although the said opinion about two habits could have some probability about theology as it is handed down in Scripture, yet about theology in itself, whose subject is the divine essence as this essence (as is said about the subject of theology [n.167]), it does not seem probable; for about that object, since it is most truly a single knowable, some knowledge truly one is of a nature to be first had about it; if another be granted which is not about it but about some other first thing, that other knowledge will not be theology in itself. Therefore, theology is a habit simply one, although perhaps there could along with it exist in Scripture some knowledge that is about some other subject.

309. Again, it is plain that the order of sciences with respect to eminence stops at one thing alone, because there cannot be two sciences first simply; that single and sole eminence I say is theology, which alone is first about the first subject of theology.

310. Further, I take the reason for it [n.306] to the opposite conclusion: that knowledge is practical in which determination is not made of things to speculate about more than the knowledge of them pertains to practice or practical knowledge; this

knowledge [of theology] does not treat of things to speculate on more distinctly than the knowledge of them is required for directing practical knowledge or practice; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: any knowledge at all of the conditions of the desirability of the end, and of the conditions of the things that are for the end insofar as they are for the end, and third of the conditions of whatever is of this sort or of other things, about which conditions the operative power can err unless it be directed, is necessary for practical knowledge; no knowledge is here here handed on about the end or about what is for the end without being of this sort; therefore etc. Or at any rate it is possible for an ignorant will to err about them, as will be said in the solution of the third objection [n.322] against the principal solution of the question.¹⁰⁸

311. The assumption is plain, because all of the conditions handed down about the end are rather of a nature to show the desirability of the end, and the conditions of the things that are for the end are of a nature to show rather the things ordered to the end.

312. To the argument [n.306], it is plain that the minor is false. For proof I say that the end known and the things for the end could not be treated of so distinctly without the whole knowledge being practical for a created intellect, because the whole of that knowledge is of a nature to show the end under the idea of desirability and to show the things that are for the end under the idea of their order to the end, or whatever a non-directed will could err about.

313. [Another opinion] – Another opinion holds the same conclusion, but posits along with this that theology is one habit simply.¹⁰⁹

B. Scotus' own Opinion

314. [On the theology of necessary things] – To the question [n.217], therefore, I reply that since an elicited act of will is most truly action, even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is plain from the first article [nn.230, 232, 234-235]), and since extension of practical knowledge consists in conformity to action and in aptitudinal priority (this is plain from the second article [nn.236-237]), it follows that that knowledge is practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but the whole of theology necessary for a created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to it; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is because the first object of theology is virtually conform to right volition, because from the idea of it are taken the principles of rectitude in volition; it also determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of the action as to all necessary theological things, naturally before any created will wills them, otherwise they would not be necessary; therefore from the first object follows both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus extension to action, from which extension knowledge itself must be called practical. A confirmation of this reason is because, since the first object of theology is the ultimate end, the principles too in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions too are practical.

315. If objection be made against this from what was said in the preceding question, where it is said that God is not the first subject here as end but as this essence [nn.167, 195]; but the principles taken from the end as it is end are practical; therefore etc.

316. Again, knowledge of the ultimate end is not immediately conform to, nor of a nature to be conform to, the eliciting of action; therefore it is not proximately practical.

317. Again, the first object virtually includes conformity to right

action, but not the knowledge thus conform alone; otherwise there could not be speculative science about it, which seems unacceptable. For how is this truth practical ‘God is triune’ or ‘the Father generates the Son’? Therefore, the first object includes some speculative knowledge. Therefore, from the virtual conformity of the first object to action it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths most theological insofar as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative.

318. Again, then the science of God, which is about the same first subject, would be practical, and it seems that the idea of the solution to the question [n.314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as to the created one.

319. To the first [n.315] I say that the respect of the end is not what the principles in any science are taken from, but the absolute subject is on which the respect is founded; that subject is ‘this essence’.

320. To the second [n.316] I say that what virtually contains conform knowledge is virtually conform, and thus is practical knowledge, because practical conclusions have practical principles; but the knowledge proximate to this one which is about the end is knowledge of enjoyment of the end, and it is of the nature to be formally conform to the action of enjoyment.

321. To the third [n.317] I say that the first object only includes knowledge conform to right volition, because by virtue of it nothing about it is known that is not either rectitude of some volition or virtually includes knowledge of such rectitude. And I concede what is inferred as unacceptable in the consequent, that about it there can be no speculative science; for necessarily knowledge of it and of anything intrinsic known through it is aptitudinally conform to action and prior, if what is known is necessary.

322. When objection is made about those truths, which seem to

be most truly theological and not metaphysical, 'God is triune', 'the Father generates the Son' [n.317], I say that these truths are practical. The first indeed virtually includes knowledge of the rectitude of love tending toward the three persons, such that if an act were elicited about one of them alone, excluding another (as an unbeliever would elicit it), the act would not be right; the second includes knowledge of the rectitude of the act which is about two persons one of whom is thus from the other [Ord. I d.1 p.1 q.2 n.2, 5, 11].

323. And if it be objected against this, that nothing save an essential is reason for terminating an act of love; but theology is more properly about the personals than about the essentials, because many essentials can be known by the metaphysician; therefore theology as distinguished from metaphysics as to what is most proper to it is not practical. The proof of the first proposition is that otherwise there would be some idea of lovability in one person that would not be in another, which is false, because then no person would be blessed in himself.

I reply: an essential is absolutely the idea of terminating an act of loving as 'that because of which', but the persons terminate an act of loving as whom are loved. For it is not sufficient for rectitude of the act that it have the fitting formal idea in the object, but there is also required that it have the fitting object in which such formal idea exists. So, besides the knowledge of rectitude which includes the essential in the act of loving God, the personals include the further proper knowledge of the required rectitude.

324. As to the fourth [n.318], it could be conceded that the theology of God about necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is of a nature as it were to generate the knowledge conform to right volition that is naturally prior to the volition. That it is conform is plain. That it is also prior is proved because the intellect first naturally under-

stands the first object before the will wills it; therefore naturally prior to volition it can have all the knowledge sufficient for it virtually included in the understanding of the first object; of such sort is any necessary knowledge whatever of the first object. The consequence supposed is plain, both because, with all will *per impossibile* excluded, the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in the understanding of the first object, since that understanding precedes all volition; – and because the divine intellect is not discursive; so it does not naturally understand the first object before it understands anything virtually included in it as to knowledge; therefore, if it understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything as to knowledge that is included in the first object before the will wills (this second proof of the consequence is less strong).

325. If it be objected that the divine will will not be the first rule of itself in its act if its act is preceded by the knowledge to which it should be conformed in acting so as to act rightly; the consequent seems unacceptable, because it takes away the supreme freedom of the divine will if it is determined by another, and not first by itself, to its first act. But if all its acts are preceded by practical knowledge, it will be determined to its first act by the intellect, because it cannot dissent from it; for then it could sin.

326. Again, it was said above [nn.300-301] that the Philosopher consequently speaks well if the intelligence naturally loves God when seen; therefore a knowledge that shows God is not practical. Let there be a like consequence about God naturally loving himself.

327. Again, what directs is a cause in respect of what is directed, so there is a real distinction between them; but there is no such distinction of God's intellection to his willing. A confirmation of the reason is because, when it is understood that an act of will has already been elicited, the intellect is not directing, for it only directs about something to be elicited as if prior to it; but in God

the willing of himself does not follow the will's existence, so his willing is never there something as it were to be elicited but is always as it were elicited; therefore etc.

328. It seems here that, in consequence of what has been said [nn.274-277, 310- 312, 314, 319-320, 322-323], one must say that, when one takes rule for what gives right guidance in action, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually first includes the knowledge of the necessary rectitude of any action, just as the first object of speculative science first includes knowledge of truths of speculation. But this first rule, which is the end, makes right in ordered way the intellect and will as these powers are of a nature to act rightly in ordered way, such that it first as it were generates knowledge conform to right action before right action, or before it makes action right; and thus, while the power is acting, there will be another power previously right, so that the consequent inferred in the first reason [n.325] seems it must be conceded. When it is rejected [n.325], one could say that, just as universally freedom stands along with previous apprehension, so supreme freedom stands along with the most perfect previous apprehension; but the most perfect apprehension of action includes knowledge of the conformity when it necessarily belongs to action.

329. When it is further argued that it would be determined by something else [n.325], one must deny this by speaking of the determination that is done by a sufficient agent. For although it could not disagree with knowledge that is right and prior to action, yet this is not as if the intellect be by its knowledge a sufficient cause actively determining the will to act, but is from the perfection of the will, that it is only of a nature to act in conformity with the prior power in acting, when that prior power acts first perfectly about its object, that is, when it knows first as much as it can know. But I say this for contingent things, of which the divine intellect does not have all the knowledge possible to it before all act of the will; therefore, as to those con-

tingent things, it is not necessary that it act in conformity with the prior power, because it does not first conformably know such object. But as to knowables necessary of themselves it always happens otherwise, because they contain the most perfect knowledge of themselves without an act of will.¹¹⁰

330. Now although this response [n.328-329] seem to avoid the argument [n.325], and although the subsequent arguments [n.326-327] could be avoided, yet one must say otherwise, that necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because there is no natural priority of intellection to volition that is, as it were, of the conformative to what needs to be conformed or of directive to something that needs to be directed: because once any knowledge whatever of rectitude of the action has been posited, although it could of itself conform a conformable or directable power from elsewhere, yet not the divine will with respect to its first object, because it is rectified of itself alone with respect to the object, for either it naturally tends toward it or, if it tends freely, it is not of itself in any way as it were indifferent to rectitude or as it were in any way from elsewhere possessed of it, such that determinate knowledge of rectitude is not necessarily prior to volition as if the volition require it so as to be rightly elicited; but it only pre- requires the ostension of the object; and the knowledge that is of itself directive it does not pre- require as directive but only as ostensive, such that if ostension alone of the object could precede volition and knowledge of the necessary rectitude of the action could follow (as will be said of action about contingents [n.333]), volition would be equally rightly elicited then and now. Therefore, intellection is not now prior and conformative or regulative.

331. To the argument, therefore, that proves the priority of knowledge of rightness to right action [n.324], it can be replied that though there be some priority of intellection to volition, yet it is not in such way prior that it require right cognition to be prior to action, because such priority is of rule to ruled, of which

sort there cannot be when the will is in every way rule of itself in acting.

The sum of this controversy about the science of God with respect to himself, whether it be practical, consists in this: if the knowledge, which of itself would be directive in action (given that the rectifying or acting power in the knower were directable in acting), be practical from the fact alone that thus it would be directive, or not practical from the fact that the doing power in the knower is not directable – let him who holds either one of the sides speak accordingly.

332. [About the theology of contingents] – From this is introduced the second article of the question, namely about the theology of contingents, whether it be practical [nn.314, 324, 330; 1 d.38 q. un. nn.1-4]. I say that in that intellect alone can the theology of contingent things be practical which can have determinate knowledge of the rectitude of action before all volition of the understander or before the elicited action, because only there is this theology of contingent things able to be or is conform to action and prior to it. Of such sort is every created intellect, because of no created understander does the will first determine the contingent rectitude befitting its action.

333. But in the divine intellect contingent theology cannot be practical if one holds onto these two points, namely that practical knowledge and the action to which it is extended ought necessarily to belong to the same supposit,¹¹¹ and that of God as operating there is no action save volition (not positing in him a third power other than intellect and will), for no knowledge conform to action or to contingent right volition precedes in the divine intellect its right action or the volition of God, because by volition is such rectitude first determined to such action.

334. The first point is true, for if any knowledge at all about the action of another be practical, then my knowledge about this,

which is ‘God creates the world’ or about this, which is ‘an intelligence moves the heavens’, will be practical. At least this seems to prove that practical knowledge cannot belong to a lower intelligence or understander when something else is operating according to that action or, by parity of reasoning, belong to a higher or an equal if it do nothing for the action of the operator; but if it do do something, already does the superior have its proper action with respect to which its knowledge is practical.

335. Again, if practical knowledge has any causality with respect to the action to which it is extended, and is not of a nature to have such causality save first in respect of the action that is in the one who understands, the thing proposed [n.333] seems to follow.

336. On the contrary: therefore, about the same thing one intellect would have practical knowledge and another speculative, if action were possible to one intellect and not the other.

It can be said that perfect rectitude of action includes the circumstance of the one operating and also the other circumstances, so that without it there is no rectitude. For if ‘God is to be loved’ is taken, unless it be added by what, namely by the will, it is not a practical truth completely, because God is not to be loved by a brute; therefore this perfect truth ‘God is to be loved by God’ is practical in any intellect whatever; thus too this one, ‘man should sometimes fast’, is practical not only to a man who knows it but also to an angel and to God; so also is this practical for man and God ‘the heaven is to be moved by an angel’, – and I concede as unacceptable what the first proof infers [n.334].

337. And if it be objected that the priority of practical knowledge to action is not preserved – for love with respect to himself is right before a man or an angel could understand ‘God is to be loved by God’ – I reply: this priority ought to be from the object and the intellect, that is, that it naturally determine the intellect

to knowledge of determinate rectitude of action, namely as far as it is of itself in advance of action; in this way this object is of a nature to determine any intellect whatever to the knowledge 'God is to be loved by God' as far as it is of itself in advance of action, although some intellect, because of its own imperfection, is not determined before the acting power, because of its own perfection, acts.

338. To the other objection [n.336] I say that just as the will can be a superior cause with respect to the action of the moving power, not however any will at all with respect to any power at all, for example, not my will with respect to the motive power of an angel, but when it is in the same subject, so that if it be a practical cause with respect to action, this is in the same understander and the same operator; nor is it necessary that in another it be non-practical, save by taking practical strictly for what is immediately applicable to a work to the extent it depends on the identity of supposit of knower and doer, which sort of immediacy is denoted by the infinitive that signifies action when construed with the verb 'to know' – for in this way it is conceded that only God knows that he loves himself infinitely, although an angel may know that he is to be infinitely loved by himself.

339. He who thus responds must from the beginning concede that every truth about the actions of created agents is known by some acting intellect, because all of them, whether by the object if they are necessary or by something else if they are contingent, are of a nature to be first conform to actions or first to determine the rectitude of action before actions be elicited. But all truths about divine volition, when necessary indeed are practical, but not when contingent, because before the elicited action to which they are extended, they do not have conformity, because no determination of rectitude; for example, God knows practically that man should repent and the angel should move, but not that God must wish a holy man to repent or an angel to move.

340. If you ask of what sort theology of contingents is in itself, when not compared with this intellect or that, it can be said that it is such in itself as it is from its object; but it is not from its object conform to action in advance of every action, because from the object no determinate knowledge of contingent rectitude is of a nature to be had; therefore from its object it is not practical, therefore it is speculative, if these sufficiently divide knowledge [n.303]. Congruent with this is that in the divine intellect it is denied to be practical [n.333]; for a thing seems to be such in itself as it is in a perfect instance in the genus, not as it is in an imperfect one.

341. If it be objected that then knowledge speculative in itself is practical for someone, to wit for a created intellect, therefore the practical is not repugnant to the speculative, I reply: to be speculative from the object is to be *per se* speculative; so, to be practical from an object that sufficiently determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude – and if sufficiently then prior to volition – is to be *per se* practical. In this way are these two opposed, as also these 'not-extendable to action' and 'extendable to action'. But to be practical from something other than the object, to wit from an extrinsic cause, as from the will determining the intellect to knowledge of action, is to be accidentally practical; so I concede that the theology of contingent things is practical for us, though in itself it is speculative.

342. Against this: that to which one opposite *per se* belongs the other opposite belongs to neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; therefore knowledge *per se* speculative is not practical either *per se* or *per accidens*.

I reply: although the antecedent could be expounded of *per se* in the first or the second mode, not however in the third mode insofar as it states the same as the solitary [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a-34-b10], yet I concede that in no mode of inhering does

the opposite inhere of this predicate which is '*per se* practical' or of this predicate '*per se* speculative', because contingent theology *per se* in the second mode is *per se* practical or speculative, such that both the inherence is *per se* and the predicate is determined by the '*per se*'. But *per accidens* to be practical *per accidens* is not opposed to that, just as to be black simply and to be white in some respect are not opposed; for 'in some respect' and 'simply' determine predicates as denominative. If it is argued 'it *per se* is *per se* speculative, therefore it *per se* is speculative', I concede it, nor to this predicate is the predicate '*per accidens* practical' opposed.

343. But if the other of these two [n.333] that this response holds [n.340] be not held, then it can be conceded that contingent theology, although it not be in itself practical because not so from its object, yet in every intellect created and uncreated it would be practical *per accidens*, because it can in the divine intellect be conform to action before the action be elicited by a created will; for the intellect of God knew that the adult sinner in the New Law ought to be ground down before the sinner is ground down. And by not holding to the first of those, the knowledge of God about the action of some other actor is practical; by not holding also to the second of them, to wit by positing the acting of God extrinsically to be an action of his different from the volition of God formally, although the divine intellect did not know that *a* must be created before his will will it, yet he did know before he create, and so conform knowledge precedes the external action, although it is not conform from the object but from elsewhere.

344. This at any rate I hold to, that the theology of contingents is not *per se* practical or from its object; yet for a created intellect it can be *per accidens* practical, and this in the intellect doing the understanding to which it belongs to act according to the action for which rectitude is determined by the divine will. But as to whether it is practical for the divine intellect, it is plain

by holding those two positions [n.333] or the opposites [n.343] what should be said as a consequence. These three things, however, seem probable: first, that the practical is regulative in the action of what is contingent, and second that it is regulative of the power of the doer who is rectifiable from elsewhere than from himself, and third that in God there is no power of doing save will. From the first and third it follows that if divine knowledge were practical, it would be rectificative or regulative in divine volition; but this is false from the second of them [n.333], because the will of itself first rightly elicits willing with respect to the first object, but with respect to second ones, which it is of contingently, it is determined from itself alone, not by any preceding knowledge of rectitude.

VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

345. To the principal arguments of the first question. To the first [n.217] I say that faith is not a speculative habit, and that to believe is not a speculative act, nor is vision that follows believing speculative but practical; for the vision is of a nature to be conform to enjoyment and it is first naturally had in a created intellect so that right fruition may be elicited in conformity with it.

346. To the second [n.218] one must say that the contingent thing that practical science is about is the end or what is for the end; but in doable things action is the ultimate end according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139b3-4; therefore, the contingency of action suffices for the object of practical science.

347. Against this is argued, first, that science is of necessary things; therefore, there is no science about contingent things. The antecedent is plain from the definition of 'to know' in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b15-16.

348. Likewise from *Ethics* 6.2.1139a3-15, the scientific is distinguished from the ratiocinative by reference to the necessary and the contingent [n.226], therefore all the habits of the scientific part are about the necessary; but science is a habit of that part; therefore etc.

349. Further, if theology is about the contingent doable, therefore it is habit active with true reason; but, as is said in *Ethics* 6.5.1140b20-21, this is the definition of prudence; therefore theology is prudence, not science.

350. To the first [nn.347-348] I reply: about contingent things there are many necessary truths, because it is a necessary conclusion that an act that is contingently elicited should be such as to be right; about it, then, there is science as to the conclusion necessarily deduced, although it is in itself contingent as far as it is elicited by its proper power.

The response then is plain to the authority of the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* [n.347]: science is of something necessary said about the contingent, and so necessary truths are included in the understanding of the contingent, or they are deduced about something that is contingent by reason of some prior necessary thing [*Posterior Analytics* 1.8.75b24-25, 33-36; n.212].

Through this same point to the authority of the Philosopher in the *Ethics* [n.348]: because the habit of the ratiocinative part is about an act insofar as it is contingently elicited; but the scientific habit or science is about the same thing insofar as something about it is necessarily deduced. If it be objected that there is not the same object for a scientific habit and for a ratiocinative one, there will be discussion about this below [n.351], as to how there can be the same object for several habits, though not the same habit for several objects.

351. To the second [n.349] I say that it would prove that moral

science is prudence, for moral science is a habit active with true reason. Therefore, I say that the definition of prudence must be understood of the proximate active habit, of which sort is the habit acquired from acts. Hence, as art is related, in respect of makeable things, to the habit of the expert, so is moral science, in respect doable things, related to the habit of prudence, because the habits of art and of moral science are as it were remote to giving direction, since they are universal; but the habits of prudence and of the expert, because they are generated from acts, are particular and proximate to giving direction. This exposition is necessary, otherwise there would be no practical science, because any practical science is a habit of doing or of making; the conclusion, however, is unacceptable and contrary to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b25, as it seems, and against Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70ra), and against other authors.

352. To the third reason [n.219] I say that Boethius understands by theology metaphysics. And as to the fact he says it is about the substance of God, I say that God is considered in that science insofar as it is possible for him to be considered in acquired sciences.

353. To the other [n.220] I say that it is a mark of nobility in an inferior that it attains what is superior, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 7.14.1333a21-22. Hence the sense power of man is nobler than the sense power of a brute, because in man it is ordered to the intellective power. A mark, therefore, of nobility in a science is that it is ordered to the act of a nobler power. But the Philosopher does not posit any science to be conform to the action of the will about the end, because he did not posit the will to have an action about the end but as it were a certain simple natural motion, and therefore he posited that there can be no nobler science by conformity to the end; if however he had posited some action about the end, he would not have denied, as it seems, that practical science in respect to that action was nobler

than speculative science about the same thing, for example, if there were some speculative science about what moral science is about, he would not say that the speculative science was nobler than the moral science. But we do posit that there is true action about the end, to which knowledge is of a nature to be conform, and therefore that practical knowledge about the end is nobler than any speculative knowledge. Therefore, the first proposition of the argument [n.220], which seems it can be taken from the *Metaphysics*, although the Philosopher not expressly say it, is to be denied.

354. To the first proof of it [n.220] I say that what is for its own sake is nobler than what is for the sake of some act inferior to itself; but whatever he posits as practical is for the sake of something lower than speculative consideration, because it is at least about some object lower than what he posits as the object of speculative consideration; and therefore any practical science that he posits is less noble than something speculative. Now what is for the sake of some other act, nobler than its own proper act, is not, because of such order, less noble; for then our sense power would be less noble than the sense power of the brute.

To the second proof of the denied proposition, when the discussion is about certitude [n.220], I say that any scientific knowledge in respect of its object is equally certain proportionally, because any science makes resolution to its immediate principles; but it is not equally certain in quantity, because these principles are more certain knowables than those. So everything that the Philosopher posits practical science about is a less certain and perfect knowable in itself than what he posits some speculative science about; therefore some speculative science according to him is posited to be more certain than any practical science in quantity. Now we posit the doable knowable, that is, the attainable by operation, which is truly action, to be in itself most knowable, and therefore science about it is neither in quantity, as neither in proportion, of certitude exceeded by any other sci-

ence.

355. To the other reason about necessary existents [n.221] I say that this science was not invented for the sake of extrinsic necessities but for intrinsic ones (as namely for the order and moderation of passions and actions), just as moral science, if it were invented after all extrinsic necessities had been possessed, would no less be practical. Now this science was not invented 'for escaping ignorance', because many more knowables could be handed down in so great a quantity of doctrine than have here been handed down; but here the same things are frequently repeated, so that the listener may more efficaciously be induced to the doing of the things that are here made convincing.

VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question.

356. To the arguments of the second question. To the authority of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* [n.223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as known; for the intellect that is calculating for the sake of something is calculating for the sake of the end as known and as it is a principle of demonstration.

357. To the second authority from the *Metaphysics* [n.224] I say that the practical is not for the sake of use as *per se* end; yet it does have some relation to use, such that use is its *per se* object, or something that virtually includes use, of which sort the Philosopher did not posit there to be any being save a being for the end; and every such object is less noble than an object of speculation; and therefore such order to action proves the ignobility of the practical with respect to the speculative.

358. To the third from the *Metaphysics* [n.225] I say that the speculative and practical have diverse ends speaking of *per se* ends within the genus of knowledge, but those ends do not first

distinguish them, but there is a prior distinction from the objects, as was said before [nn.252-255, 259, 265-266].

359. To the reasons for the opposite position when argument is given against distinction through objects:

To the first [n.249] I say that a speculative habit and a practical habit cannot be about the same object. – But when the opposite is proved through the remark of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* that “the intellect is made practical by extension,” I say that the Philosopher does not say this, namely that the speculative intellect is made practical by extension; but Aristotle, when he posits three grades of intellect, of which the first considers speculables only, the second considers doables, not by commanding to pursue or flee, he says that “by extending itself further it wants to pursue or flee,” so that this extension is of intellect imperfectly practical to consideration perfectly practical, to wit from apprehension of things terrible to a complete command about them, prescribing flight or pursuit. A concession, however, that the speculative intellect is made practical is not to the purpose, because ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ are accidental differences of the intellect, although they are essential differences of habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.

360. To the other about medicine [n.250], someone says that the universal habit is speculative but when from it the particular habit is acquired, it then becomes practical. – On the contrary: then from speculative principles a practical conclusion would follow, which is unacceptable.

361. Therefore it must be said in another way that, when there are extreme opposites, the more something departs from one of the opposites, so much the more does it approach the other; the most actual idea of the practical does the consideration have that is of a nature to be immediately conform formally to the action to be elicited; therefore the more something departs from

this, so much the more does it approach the speculative; therefore the universal habit, which is not of a nature to be immediately conform to action, can be said in some way to be speculative with respect to some habit that is immediately of a nature to be conform to the action to be elicited. In this way art could be set down as a speculative habit with respect to the habit of the expert, because art, as being a more universal habit, is not so immediately directive, as appears from *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a14-24, “the artisan will frequently err, the expert will not err.” In this way can medicine be distinguished into the speculative, which namely is about universal causes and cures, which knowledge is more remote from the action to be elicited, and into the practical, which is about particulars and things closer to action and more immediately conform to the action to be elicited. However, in truth the more universal knowledge, which is called speculative comparatively, is simply and most truly practical, because it virtually includes the particular knowledge formally conform to action.

362. To the other about goodness and malice [n.251] I say that not every good act is good first from the circumstance of the end as end, nay some act is good from the circumstance of the object, to wit when the end is object, and there the circumstance of the end as object first gives rectitude to the act [nn.263-264]; for the act is simply good from the object alone, as ‘to love God’ is simply good without other circumstances. Therefore it is false that from the end as the end is distinguished from object is the first goodness of the moral act taken, nay it is false in a second way, because, although an act about a being for the end have the end for first circumstance, yet from the object there is a prior goodness, by which an act is said to be good in its kind; there is a third response, directly to the purpose [n.362], because although a circumstance formally circumstances action so that it be good, yet it does not formally circumstance practical understanding; for the intellect does not command an act moderately or in a middle way, so as to be circumstanced by this circumstance to give com-

mand moderately, but the intellect gives command according to the utmost of its power; but the 'commanding' is right from the principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.

363. Against that [n.362] is that the distinction is not through objects. The proof is because everything formally of a certain sort is of that sort through something intrinsic to it, therefore, if a habit is formally practical, this is by something intrinsic to it; but this is not the object; therefore etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot although it is virtually hot.

364. Further, the object does not distinguish the habit save as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not distinguish the effect by species, because an effect the same in species can be from causes diverse in species, as a hot thing the same in species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and by the sun.

365. To the first [n.363] I say that to be practical states something intrinsic to knowledge just as an aptitudinal respect states something intrinsic to the foundation, and that some knowledge is naturally apt to be referred, that is, by a nature intrinsic to knowledge, which nature it has from the object as from an extrinsic cause. I say then that a habit is practical by what is intrinsic as by a formal cause, but by the object, which is extrinsic, as by an efficient cause.

366. To the second [n.364] I say that although from essentially ordered causes, one of which is univocal and the other equivocal, there can, when each is causing, be an effect of one idea, as is exemplified of heat, when however proximate efficient causes of the same order to the effect cause something insofar as these causes are distinct, especially if each is univocal with the effect (whether the univocity is complete or diminished), there cannot be from such distinct causes an effect of the same idea. I say univocity is complete when there is likeness in the form and in the mode of being of the form; I say univocity is diminished when

there is likeness in the form although it have another mode of being, in the way that the house outside is from the house in the mind of the builder (hence the Philosopher calls this generation 'in some way' univocal, *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a21-25). Because therefore the object is proximate cause with respect to knowledge and is univocal, although in a diminished way, it follows that the formal distinction of objects, since these cause knowledges insofar as they are distinct, necessarily proves a formal distinction of knowledges.

FINIS PROLOGI

NOTES:

⁹⁷ That is: from the premise 'if an act is action, then it is an elicited or commanded act of the will' one first asserts 'understanding is a commanded act of the will' and then concludes 'therefore understanding is action', which is the fallacy of asserting the consequent.

An interpolation follows the text: "Note, intellection commanded by the will is either directive or not; if it is not, then it is purely speculative; if it is, either it is directive as a logical intention directs an act of discoursing or of denominating (which is an act of the intellect following an act of simple intelligence and an act of forming propositions, which is to combine and divide), and such is still speculative; or it is directive of an act of will, and then it is practical; but it is not the action that is taken here, namely not for any operation whatever but for such operation as the intellect is of a nature to be extended to, taking extension properly."

⁹⁸ Interpolation: "On the contrary: of necessity an act of intellect is prior to an act of will actually, which you set down as first ac-

tion. – True, but it does not necessarily follow thereon about the act actually of will that is action.”

⁹⁹ Interpolation: “On the contrary: in that case any knowledge would be practical, because on any knowledge there is aptitudinally apt to follow a right volition conform to them in the will which you set down as first action. – One must say that it is not true of volition of a knowable but of knowledge, and this idea is action. – On the contrary: an aptitude that belongs to one nature and repugnant to another is not seen save through something intrinsic to it; therefore, it is necessary to explain why this conformity to action belongs to this habit and is repugnant to the other. – One must say that this is from its object” [n.252].

¹⁰⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This reason is confirmed, because some practical knowledge agrees more to essential agreement with some speculative knowledge than one speculative knowledge with another. – On the contrary: the distinction of knowledges by their objects is essential. – I reply: the first distinction, which is according to essential differences, is essential and from the objects as from extrinsic causes, but there can from the same differences be some posterior non-essential distinction.”

¹⁰¹ Interpolation: “with respect to the same object.”

¹⁰² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Further, if science’s being practical and being ordered to action as to an end be converted [n.248], then moral science is not practical. The consequent is contrary to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 1.1.1095a5-6 and 2.2.1103b26-30. The proof of the consequence is because the end of moral science is happiness, which, according to him in *Ethics* 10.7.1177a12-b1, 8.1178b7-32, 9.1179a22-32, consists in speculation, not action. – It if be said that happiness is the remote end but the proximate end is action, namely to direct to an act of virtue for the sake of happiness, on the contrary: it is not necessarily ordered to giving direction except aptitudinally; but it is necessarily

practical; therefore this it will be, according to the said response [nn.253-254], because it is aptitudinally ordered to giving direction. But this is to be the same as to be directive; therefore it is practical because it is directive. But to be practical and to be directive are the same, from the second article [n.237]; therefore from the said response [nn.253-254] it follows that it is practical because it is practical. Again, to direct is an act of intellect, because it is its habit that the act is elicited from; but no act of the intellect is action, from the first article [nn.228, 232]. Therefore it would be said in another way that the end of moral science, to which it is ordered, is the act of virtue, just as also the end of prudence, – and that act is action.”

¹⁰³ Interpolation: “Now when in a previous apprehension there is determination about the rectitude of an action, but when the power of which it is the action is not in any way determinable from elsewhere, then the knowledge, although determinate, is not conformative.”

¹⁰⁴ Interpolation [from Henry of Ghent: “First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will elicits within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence it is a good action by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need something directive but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply looks to speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs something directive, and this pertains to practical science, because in it there is speculation to direct action, which is proper to practical science. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this science (unless the end is under an end) but another one which perfects the will: and from this does this science have that it is most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended

in this science is an act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object. Therefore, it is not practical science, but only simply speculative, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.' So Henry of Ghent, 'For this way' etc. [n.271]."

¹⁰⁵ Text canceled by Scotus: "The blessed cannot err about the theological object in any act; therefore they naturally have directive knowledge in respect of any act about the theological object."

¹⁰⁶ Cf. *Ord.* II d.3 p.1 q.7 n.6

¹⁰⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: "And given that such necessity is posited in the intellect from the nature of the will that loves God, would he posit necessity thus in the will of the wise man whom he himself posited as naturally happy? If not, then the wise man can be directed in such an act. – I reply: he only denied the practical to such a man because he said his happiness was speculative."

¹⁰⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: "For although the Trinity of persons does not show the end to be more desirable than if it were non-three (because the Trinity is the end insofar as being one God, not insofar as being three), however a will ignorant of the Trinity can err in loving or desiring the end by desiring to enjoy one person only. Likewise, a will ignorant that God made the world can err by not repaying the sort of love that gratitude would require for so great a communication of his goodness and one made for our utility. Thus, by being ignorant of the articles pertaining to reparation it is possible to be ungrateful, by not repaying the love due for so great a benefit. So too of other theological articles."

¹⁰⁹ Interpolation: "and this because of its one subject, which is God, in whom come together all the things that are considered

about in this science. For all fall under the consideration of this science insofar as they participate in something divine, and therefore whether it would consider them by comparison to work or not, as in the case of purely speculative science, but because of the formal unity of the subject this science is single. – Against this opinion as follows: whenever something common is divided first through certain opposite differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found under some one thing contained under that common thing; but science in general is divided first into practical and speculative; therefore, it is impossible for these differences to be found together in some one science. The major is manifest, because if differences that jointly divide some common thing could be compatible with each other in something contained in common, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and non-sensible, and the same man rational and irrational, which are absurd. The minor is plain from Avicenna at the beginning of his *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70ra), and from the Commentator in his first comment on *Ethics* 1 [Eustratius, I preface (1A)]. Again, a contradiction about one and the same thing would follow, namely that it is extended and not extended, and many other unacceptable results. – An addition."

¹¹⁰ Interpolation: "To the second [n.326] it can be said that it is not similar, because there is there simple being pleased, but here there is circumstanced efficacious willing. Likewise, the divine intellect is not only ostensive but at least equivalently regulative, which is objectual regulation and determination though not potential, which the Philosopher did not posit. – To the third [n.327] I say that, if it were conclusive, it would follow that there would not be any intellection or volition in God, since the divine essence is the motive object for both, and so goes along with the part concurring with the vital power as joint cause; I say therefore that there is only an order of quasi-effects of the same quasi-cause in the case at hand, which however is not distinct from the quasi-effects, because these effects are neither properly caused

nor produced nor do from a principle nor elicited, but simply flow out; the causality therefore is metaphorical, as commonly happens in divine reality. Or alternatively, when upholding that the intellect in some way or other directs, the assumption is denied when speaking properly of cause. To the confirmation [n.327] I say that that the order of nature suffices, which order stands along with simultaneity in duration of the knowledge for action and of the will for willing, and thus the answer is plain to the arguments, when one upholds the first way.”

¹¹¹ Interpolation: “and if it belongs to a second supposit, then it would be practical, because it is directible or determinable of the power of the second supposit, namely of the power of any created supposit whatever.”

Proof